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Regional Affairs

Review of Russian Ambassador's First Year

93AE0306B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Jan 93
p B5

[Article by 'Eyna Shapiro; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

First Year of Getting To Know Each Other

It is not easy to be ambassador in a country to which many of your former countrymen are emigrating, as Russian Ambassador Alexander Bubin has learned. This is the latest stop for the grandson of a priest who died in a labor camp—for someone whose last job was as the senior, and sometimes rebellious, news commentator for IZVESTIA and Soviet television.

When Alexander Yevgenevich Bubin presented his credentials to the president of Israel, he was the first ambassador from the Soviet Union since relations were severed in 1967. A few days later, he had become the last ambassador from the Soviet Union, and the first ambassador from Russia to Israel. This happened last winter, and he has been one of the most colorful and unusual figures on the diplomatic scene here ever since.

We met in his office in the "Textile House" on a windy, rainy evening, the kind of weather he especially likes. "See, this is how we work here, in this little office," said Bubin, sitting behind a big writing desk. Above him hangs the portrait of the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, while the white, light blue, and red Russian flag stretches across the opposite wall.

I ask the ambassador what professional retraining he has needed: Bubin was a top journalist for IZVESTIA and a political commentator for Soviet television. The new situation, he says, requires him to work long hours and learn a great deal. He dedicates long hours to reading on topics related to work. Before he came, he knew the Old and New Testaments rather well, but only here has he learned to completely understand the Jewish people's tie to the sources. Bubin himself is a baptized Christian, but does not believe—a "heretic," as his grandmother called him.

A visit to Jerusalem is not a religious or spiritual experience for him. He reached atheism through intense study and deep thought. His origin is actually from the priestly class: his grandfather was an Orthodox priest in a small town in central Russia near the city of Riazan, and during Stalin's rule he was sent to the labor camps. He did not return. In order not to hurt Alexander Bubin's chances for advancement in the "Workers' and Peasants' State," this fact was hidden from him. He was told that his grandfather had been a janitor in the church.

Bubin did rise to become one of the top journalists in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he was sometimes exiled from the television screen as punishment for stretching the line of "what is permissible" in his commentaries.

He knew the top political leaders firsthand. Brezhnev, he says, was an exceptionally good-hearted man before so much political power was concentrated in his hands; and toward the end he was almost drugged from medicines, and then-head of the KGB Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov were effectively the ones running the country.

From his job on IZVESTIA, he moved on to serve as ambassador to Israel. Now his routine is, of course, very different. "The first year of Russian-Israeli relations was a year of getting to know each other," says Bubin. "Russia, which is not yet quite on Israel's side, has begun to understand Israel; and Israel, although not of Russian origin, is beginning to discover Russia. From the diplomatic point of view, this has been a successful year. The embassy has developed good relations with the Israeli foreign ministry and the other ministries." But on the nonprofessional, human level, Ambassador Bubin has had quite a few surprises. "Let us begin with the fact that before I arrived I imagined to myself that Israel would be a much more Western country. This stands out especially in daily life. Often we run into lack of precision here, obligations not carried out, carelessness." Is this the famous "Levantine Spirit," he wonders, or perhaps the "Socialist Spirit"? Is it homemade, or imported from his homeland? And the delays! No event ever starts on time!

He was also surprised by the strength of the longing and nostalgia that immigrants have for Mother Russia, even though she treated them like stepchildren—otherwise, he says, they surely would not have left her. They like to speak Russian, write songs of yearning for Russia, and feel her pain; and Bubin, who often wanders around the country and meets people, feels the unavoidable human tragedy that comes with each wave of immigration. People turn to him for help, look to him with hope—despite the fact that there is no way he can help. The ambassador, of course, cannot interfere in the internal affairs of Israel, but in his talks with politicians, he regularly raises the topic of absorption. He is answered with understanding, but nothing really changes.

He is also helpless to fulfill requests that come to him at the right address, like requests from immigrants about their pension money from Russia. For Russia has continued the Soviet tradition of not paying to pensioners who have left the state what is due them. Bubin has recommended to his superiors that the unfair practice be changed, and in Moscow they understand the need for this, but the condition of the Russian treasury makes it impossible.

The financial situation in Russia also affects the embassy. The ambassador makes do with a Volvo instead of the Mercedes that would be appropriate for someone of his rank. Funding for embassy activities actually comes from Jews, all those hundreds of thousands who come to the embassy with requests for routine services that are given in return for payment, like visas or passport extensions. But Bubin fears that with the

opening of the Ukraine's and Belarus's independent embassies, the Russian Embassy's financial situation will become even worse.

There have been many rumors lately that Bubin may be removed from his post, as part of the replacement of Gorbachev's men with Yeltsin's. Is he packing his suitcases, then? "The situation at the top of the political spectrum in Russia is very complicated; there are many hidden factors, and anything that is not entirely against the laws of physics could happen."

Bubin has not officially heard that he is to leave his job, but adds that if the new Russian Government changes its policy, he will have to resign, for he is able to further only a policy he believes in. He does not think that the rumors of his firing are because of his pro-Israeli views, so unlike the traditional pro-Arab atmosphere in the halls of the foreign ministry in Moscow. "It does not matter to me how I seem to others. As Rabbi Zusya of Anipoli said: When I stand before God on the Day of Judgment, he will not ask me why I was not Abraham or Jacob or Moses; he will ask me why I was not Zusya. And this is exactly what it is all about," says Bubin. "I always try to remain myself, to be faithful to my beliefs. My beliefs about the situation in the Near East and the Arab-Israeli conflict have always been more objective than is customary among us. I was the first who openly brought up the need to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Against such a background of pro-Arab policy and propaganda, this approach was interpreted as pro-Israeli. Really, it is a pro-Russian stand, for it serves Russia's interests in the international arena. There is no doubt that good relations with both Israel and the Arabs will serve my country's interests."

Clearly, this change in policy has not been accepted with favor by certain Arab states, or by the Palestinians, but Bubin hopes that this is a temporary phenomenon, and that a situation will develop that will satisfy everyone. The ambassador has met with Faysal Huseyni, and if necessary, he is ready to meet with him again. In response to the terrorist activity and the expulsion of the Hamas leaders, he says, "My reactions as an individual and as Russian ambassador are exactly the same. I am against all forms of terrorist activity. This is the position of my government. The Government of Russia opposes the expulsion, and believes that no punitive act will uproot the terror. The solution to the problem is a comprehensive political settlement."

Responding to the suggestion that many officials in the Russian foreign ministry have a pro-Arab orientation, the ambassador says that these workers come from an Arabist background from the point of view of their higher education, diplomatic experience, and political education. "But," he adds, "new times, new songs." He starts from the basic assumption that the Russian foreign ministry does not serve the interests of either Arabs or Israelis, but rather the vital interests of Russia. The workers in the embassy here in Israel are also Arabists, but Bubin does not think they have an outstandingly pro-Arab orientation.

I tell him about the diplomat from the Canadian Embassy who, before accepting an invitation to visit our home in Jerusalem, clarified whether we live in a neighborhood within the green line. Ambassador Bubin does not do that. After one of his visits across the green line, the PLO representative in Moscow presented a complaint to the foreign ministry, and they answered her, "Please do not mix geography with politics!"

How will the second year of relations between Russia and Israel look? Ambassador Bubin has clear answers. This year, we will need to build a firm legal basis for relations between the two countries. Agreements are waiting to be signed between the two nations in all sorts of areas: trade, investment, science, culture, education. Some of the agreements will already be signed during Prime Minister Rabin's visit to Moscow. There is also another very practical problem to be worked out between Israel and Russia—the problem of dual citizenship. Usually the attitude of governments toward dual citizenship is cool, but in this case, we are speaking not of a political question, but a humanitarian problem, and the ambassador recommends to the two governments that they look at it from that point of view.

Bubin prefers to meet his diplomatic colleagues privately rather than at receptions, for only thus is it possible to talk about things that are really essential. The lack of a tie around his neck, he does not see as breaking with convention, but explains it rather as due to his conservative habits. "In diplomacy, style is dictated by the relationship between outward form and content. In the diplomatic times of Talleyrand, Disraeli, and Prince Gorchakov, outward manners were respected no less than was content. In the 20th century, content pushes outward form aside, and I hope that diplomacy will continue to develop in this direction."

EC Official in Occupied Territories on Peace Process

93BR7060A Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French
1 Feb 93 p 6

[Interview with Tomas Dupla, Spaniard, EC Commission representative to the occupied territories, by Robert Verdussen; place and date not given: "Tomas Dupla: 'The EC Is Not Bringing Its Weight To Bear in the Middle East'"]

[Text] "The Palestinians feel that the European Community should put pressure on Israel and that it is not bringing its weight to bear in the Middle East."

Tomas Dupla is the European Commission representative to the occupied territories. The post was created in September 1991 and is the equivalent of the Commission representation to Israel, a post filled by the Belgian Albert Maes (see: LA LIBRE BELGIQUE of 25 January). However, while Mr. Maes works in Tel Aviv, Tomas Dupla is forced to live in Brussels. "That's the problem, because normally I would be living in the occupied territories," he says. Negotiations with the

Israeli authorities recently led to an agreement: Mr. Dupla hopes to be able to move to Jerusalem after the summer.

Large Program

According to the high-level Spanish official, "my mission consists of facilitating the dispatch of Community aid to the occupied territories. The European program is relatively large, with a per capita amount that is undoubtedly the highest in the Mediterranean. There are many projects and it is necessary to have someone on site."

One of Mr. Dupla's other missions is to export Palestinian products abroad, with all the technical assistance that this implies. Is this a sort of ambassador's role?

"No. The occupied territories are not a sovereign state. They do not have a government," says the Commission representative. "This rules out a large proportion of the traditional work of an ambassador. But this situation makes it all the more difficult to dispatch aid."

Consequently, the main difficulty facing Mr. Dupla lies in the absence of institutions. Who are his dialogue partners?

With Whom?

"The Palestinians in general. I do not have a clearly designated dialogue partner because there has never been a state. However, there are political groups and institutions which, legally speaking, are considered private institutions. So I have contacts with those that have a national outlook." Apart from contacts concerning the problem of his residency, Mr. Dupla has no contact with the Israeli authorities, "because, from the Community's point of view, Israel and the occupied territories constitute two different political entities—apart from the de facto control imposed by the occupation."

As a result, political problems are a major source of interference in the Commission representative's work. The decision to allocate Community aid to the occupied territories was made on humanitarian grounds, but is clearly not exempt from political aims, which are to be viewed within the broader situation in the Middle East, since it is the Palestinians who are at the center of it. "The Gulf war, the peace process, and the deportees issue have all had an impact on Community aid, whether in the choice of projects or their execution," explains Mr. Dupla.

Contributing Toward Peace

Adopting a broader view, we could say that Dupla's mission consists of contributing toward peace by means of economic development. "The Palestinians have a positive perception of Community aid," he says. "From the political point of view, they feel that the Community is slightly more favorable toward Israel, whereas the Israelis feel that the Community is completely pro-Palestinian. This probably means that our position is balanced."

Mr. Dupla has no contact with the Islamic Hamas movement, whose militants were deported to southern Lebanon, "because Hamas is a military organization and economic development has nothing to do with Islamic resistance. However, if we do have contacts with people linked to Hamas, it is to the extent that the Community obviously does not exclude Muslims since they comprise the vast majority of the Palestinian population. These contacts are linked to Islamic universities or hospitals."

Strategy for Disarming Middle East

93WC0015Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Jan 93
p B2

[Article by General Ben; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

How To Demilitarize the Region

The Egyptians are no longer satisfied with calling for the dismantling of nuclear weapons—they also want to halt the race for high-tech armaments and the Israeli plan for development and launching of photography satellites.

The Israeli proposal for demilitarization of the Near East, presented the day before yesterday as part of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres's speech at the signing ceremony for the "International Treaty for the Liquidation of Chemical Weapons," was a landmark in the development of contacts towards arms control in the region. In the view of Dr. Shai Feldman of the Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, arms control has its place in Israeli defense policy and finds expression in the decisions the Rabin government has made.

In the six months that have passed since the change of administration in Jerusalem, the government has broken barriers it inherited from its predecessors, and decided to sign the "Chemical Weapons Liquidation Treaty" unconditionally; to agree to EC participation in the multilateral talks on arms control; to carry on a direct dialogue with Egypt on this subject; and to announce an official Israeli policy on arms control, in the form of a statement of objectives presented by Peres.

Israel's opponent at the arms control talks is Egypt, which over the last few years has been conducting a stubborn diplomatic fight to clear the region of nuclear weapons. The Egyptians have not hidden the fact that they intend first of all to have the atomic reactor at Dimona closed down. The Egyptian defense minister, Muhammad Sa'id Tantawi, said a month and a half ago that the unconventional weapons in Israel's hands threaten the security of his country—along with Iranian fundamentalism.

Last week, a retired Egyptian general visited Israel, and appeared at the conference on arms control at Kibbutz Ginosar's Center for Strategic Studies. The general presented in detail the Egyptian position on arms control negotiations. The proposals from Cairo seem like a reverse image of the Israeli defense perception. Almost every paragraph was meant to neutralize another of the

components of Israel's might, under the banner of "balance of power" among the states in the region.

The Egyptians presented a three-stage plan for regional arms control:

- Learning from the experience of the great powers, and of other states outside the Near East, and clarifying the positions of the sides in the region (as of now, the multilateral talks are mentioned at this stage).
- Public declaration by the sides of the steps they are ready to take in the arms control process (the sides committing themselves to present their statements of objectives before the next round of talks).
- Practical steps to limit arms build-up and cut down current stocks, according to an agreed order of priorities.

At the head of the Egyptian order of priorities stands dismantling of nuclear arms. "On this subject, our positions are completely at odds," the general says. "Israel insists on keeping her nuclear arsenal complete, and wants its continued existence written into any future agreement. The Egyptians and Arabs want to remove all nuclear arms from the region and to create a region free of weapons of mass destruction."

The general made it clear that any agreement that does not solve the nuclear question cannot provide a stable and lasting peace. The sides that do not have nuclear weapons will try to achieve a similar option, in order to reduce the threat. Liquidation of the weapons of mass destruction will increase security and trust among the sides, and deepen the peace.

In his words, even after the removal of nuclear weapons from the Near East, Israel will still have a clear advantage over the Arabs. In her hands will remain the infrastructure and knowledge to construct the nuclear weapons anew at any time, and the Egyptians see this as a deterrent force in itself.

After nuclear weapons, the Egyptians want to halt the race for advanced technological armaments and their military applications in space. Israeli experts believe that this proposal is intended to curb the technological potential of the defense industry, which gives the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] an advantage over the weapons systems the Arabs possess. Egypt also opposes the Israeli plan for developing and launching photography satellites into space, something that Israel sees as very important for strengthening the intelligence deterrent. "Israel worries greatly about surprise attacks, but nobody thinks of initiating such an offensive any more," the Egyptian general said, "Today, we are using the peace offensive President Sadat used in 1977."

Egypt proposes that the great conventional armies, which Israel sees as the main threat to her security, be reduced in the final stage of the process.

The Egyptian general says that the goal of the arms control process is "to achieve a higher level of national security for all the states, with the lowest possible level of

armaments. In the Near East of the future, stability will be achieved through political and economic means, not by use of arms."

But, in his words, there is no point in talking about smaller armies before peace agreements and stability are achieved.

Effective reduction of armies depends, in his words, on four conditions:

- Balance in the size and quality of armies and defense industries
- Achievement of security through an agreed-upon political solution, without military supremacy
- Existence of an effective supervisory force
- Inclusion of all states in the region in the process, without distinction or discrimination

The basic principle in reduction of armaments is readiness of the sides to reveal their military capacity, especially in the realms of nuclear science, advanced technology, and satellites.

Israel strongly opposes the idea of balance of technical force, because its military superiority is meant to compensate for its overwhelming numerical inferiority compared to the Arab world. It also demands that arms control talks be linked to progress in the peace negotiations, and asserts that demilitarization will be possible only after peace is achieved. The Israelis agree with the Egyptians that all states of the region should be included in any future arrangement, if it is to be viable.

In the arms control talks, Israel's representatives suggested learning from the experience of the great powers, and beginning the process with first steps toward building trust and easing tensions, such as advance announcements of military exercises, direct contact between commanders, and jointly dealing with sea or air disasters. The Egyptian viewpoint is the opposite. The Arabs oppose any direct contact between the armies that might be interpreted as recognizing Israel's legitimacy before peace agreements are finalized.

"Israel puts the emphasis on technical aspects of building trust, which the Arabs are not ready for," said the general. "In Egypt, we do not separate the building of trust and the control of arms. The two should exist concurrently, not separately."

During the latest round of arms control talks, held in Moscow in September, the Egyptian delegates suggested that Israel sign the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," a treaty that Israel strongly opposes. "We already have a peace agreement and mutual trust," the Egyptians explained, "and the treaty would be suitable as a apparatus for extending this trust and security to the rest of the region."

The Egyptians say that the tools suitable for building trust are public declarations by the sides taking part in the talks concerning the steps they are ready to take in the arms control process, such as participation in international treaties and reduction in the size of armies, and

on their order of priorities. Such declarations express the political will of the governments involved in the process, and in the Egyptian opinion, every practical step begins with a political decision.

This week Egypt played the stubborn role, which Israel usually plays. Cairo joined the Arab bloc in refusing to sign the "Chemical Weapons Liquidation Treaty," which Israel has accepted. The Arabs demand that Israel sign the nuclear treaty as a condition for their participation in the chemical treaty. On the eve of his leaving for Paris to sign the chemical treaty, Peres used the opportunity for a diplomatic exercise: he called the Egyptian foreign minister, 'Amr Musa, and read him the Israel demilitarization program.

The game of cat and mouse between Israel and Egypt can be expected to continue in the years to come, and even to worsen, before arrangements on arms control are reached. The next round of multilateral talks is planned to be held in Washington on 9 February. All the sides are waiting for Bill Clinton's administration to come into office. According to the new president's early statements, he will speed up the arms control talks and the efforts to prevent the spread of unconventional weapons.

Internal Affairs

Plans To Expropriate Land in North Jerusalem

93AE0306D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Jan 93
p B2

[Article by Nadav Shraga'i; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

The Disputed Lands in North Jerusalem

From the beginning, building Jewish neighborhoods in post-1967 Jerusalem has been a political issue. When the Arabs did not sell their lands willingly, the lands were expropriated. This did not prevent the Arabs from continuing to do plenty of building—just without licenses. A new expropriation is on the agenda, the largest since 1980.

In 1967, the Government of Israel, then headed by Levi 'Eshkol, tried to avoid expropriating lands from the Arabs in Jerusalem. In those days, there was a debate in the government between those siding with expropriation and those who were against it. Against this background, an interesting trial was made, which lasted several months: the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs made the secret decision to set up a company to act as a front for the government and serve as middleman between Arab land owners and Jewish entrepreneurs. The intention was to transfer as much land as possible to Jews and erect Jewish settlements on them, in order to establish political facts that would make the redivision of Jerusalem impossible. The Arabs, to the disappointment of those ministers who opposed expropriation, were not seduced. They well understood what was hidden behind the business exterior, and refused to

sell their lands. After a few months, the company was dismantled, and a great wave of expropriations began.

A total of 17,000 dunams were expropriated in the first years after the Six-Day War, at the Ma'arakh government's initiative. About a third of the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem—140,000 people—live on these lands today, in a string of new neighborhoods along the jurisdictional line. Neve Ya'akov, Ramot, 'Armon Hanatziv, Gilo, Ramot 'Eshkol, Sanhedria Hamurhevet, Giv'at Hamivtar, French Hill, and Pisgat Z'ev, are all built on the territory annexed to the State of Israel after the Six-Day War, south, east, and also north of the old jurisdictional borders (Jerusalem's territory of jurisdiction was tripled in 1967, from 38,000 dunams to about 110,000 dunams).

Against this background, it seems that the dimensions of the territory, which the municipality of Jerusalem recently recommended that the Housing Ministry expropriate from Arabs in north Jerusalem—800 dunams, on which another Jewish neighborhood will arise between Pisgat Z'ev and French Hill—are not large relative to what has already been expropriated from the Arabs in the city since 1967. The surprise perhaps stems from the timing, and also from the fact that the mayor, Teddy Kollek, was apparently not aware that planning the territory as a new Jewish neighborhood involved expropriating land from Arabs. To tell the truth, expropriation of private lands to create political facts in the capital seems like something from another era. Except for one large expropriation in 1980—4,600 dunams between Neve Ya'akov and French Hill, on which the various Pisgat Z'ev developments were built—the majority of the expropriations were carried out in the first few years after the Six-Day War.

Contacts concerning the plan mentioned above—with outgoing Minister of Housing Ariel Sharon and, more recently, with Minister of Housing Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer—even more than they testify to the rather naive faith that the story would not be leaked, testify to the difficult and protracted struggle going on over the vacant lands and various developments in east Jerusalem, between the various branches of the Israeli establishment and the Arab residents of east Jerusalem, backed by their nationalist institutions.

The Jewish settlement in east Jerusalem after 1967 was political from the beginning. The guiding rule was not to settle in areas heavily populated by Arabs. The "bible" of Israeli policy in the territories annexed to Jerusalem was more or less based on one paragraph of the decision of the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs, which set as a "national goal" the guarding of the existing ratio between the Jewish and Arab populations—about 78 percent to 22 percent. This has been at the expense of the Arab population of the city. Its growth rate has been higher over the years than that of the Jewish population, but in spite of this, many fewer housing units have been built for Arabs than have been built for Jews.

Until 1983, almost no construction projects were authorized for Arabs in east Jerusalem. Just a year ago, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies determined that this policy was deliberate. The research team of the institute (which includes Teddy Kollek among its founders) determined that "The Israeli staff had trouble agreeing on the best planning concept, and for political reasons put off preparing a descriptive program or detailed plans until 1983...the root of the problem was the desire to protect the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, and from this grew the trend not to authorize Arab construction on a large scale. Behind this policy was the misguided basic assumption that lack of planning and not giving building licenses would lessen the extent of construction in the Arab sector, but reality has proven that Arab building has not been stopped. It has continued to develop, both within the city and outside of it...."

Without organized planning, most of the building projects in east Jerusalem were allowed according to an arrangement based on Paragraph 78 of the "Law of Planning and Construction." Building permits of this kind, originally meant to solve short-term ad hoc problems until organized plans could be prepared, were passed out almost wholesale by the Jerusalem municipality, from Kafr 'Akav in the north to Tzur Ba'hr in the south. At the same time, the Israel policy also gave birth to illegal Arab construction on a large scale, which the municipality and the interior ministry had difficulty controlling. What made the Israeli administration's frustration worse was the fact that the built-up area in the Arab settlements grew over the years with no connection to the growth of the population itself. Studies and aerial photographs show that in the years 1967-84 alone, the built-up areas in the Arab settlements in the Jerusalem region grew at a rate of 119 percent, while population grew by no more than a few dozen percentage points.

The extensive taking of land by the Arabs, who have built low, wide, and scattered, has found its expression mainly in north Jerusalem. On a mountainside north of the city, on the main Jerusalem-Ramallah road, lie the town of 'Al Bira and the settlements Shu'afat, 'A-Ram, Kafr 'Akav, 'Atarot, and Kalandia. In these settlements, located partly within the Jerusalem jurisdictional borders, there were until about a year ago some 3,500 structures over and above the 1,500 that existed there in 1967. The sources of funding for the fast rising, unregulated Arab construction were varied, from Jordan or the Persian Gulf States to the PLO and private funds.

In the late 1970s, it seemed to the government that the Arab population was threatening to close off the Jewish option between the northernmost neighborhood of Jerusalem, Neve Ya'akov, and French Hill to the south of it. Highways that had been planned were being blocked by Arab construction, and territory that had been earmarked for Jewish construction was taken up by Arabs. It was therefore decided to expropriate 4,600 dunams between the two neighborhoods, and in time Pisgat Z'ev was built on this land. David Levi and Yig'al

Horovitz were the architects of this expropriation, which created a great storm. Teddy Kollek supported the action, but attacked the timing—in a way, incidentally, amazingly similar to the form of the announcement he made this week about the plan his professionals have finalized for the planning and expropriation of 800 additional dunams in the same area.

In a colloquium Kollek took part in back then, together with Meron Benvenisti and the late MAPAM [United Workers Party] leader, Ya'akov Hazan, he explained in principle his support of the expropriations: "Jerusalem should be built in a way that makes it impossible to divide her again. Without expropriation of land, tens of thousands of Jews would not be living in the new neighborhoods today. There was no other choice than to take this action. We tried to take territory in the western part of the city and give it to the Arabs, but to my sorrow, we did not succeed in convincing even one of the necessity of this move, and even if we had convinced them, it would not have been enough to ease the feelings of the Arabs toward us after the expropriation."

The incentive for expropriating another 800 dunams south of the territory that was expropriated in 1980 was born of similar circumstances: the fear that an Arab wedge would be driven in between Pisgat Z'ev and French Hill, against a background of what seemed to the authorities in Jerusalem like further danger of Arab obstruction. The accelerated Jewish construction in the north Jerusalem region in the last few years, and the construction that will be carried out there in the next few years, put an effectual end to a basic debate that had gone on over two approaches, each of which supported a different concept of the direction development in Jerusalem should take.

Housing Ministry representatives said after the Six-Day War that most of the work of expropriation and development would have to be done in the southern part of the city, with the goal of connecting Jerusalem and Bethlehem. In the mid-1970s, a commission headed by 'Arnon Gafni, former managing director of the Finance Ministry, presented to the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs a series of recommendations, the most important of which was a plan for extending Jerusalem's territory, especially southward. This extension, the committee explained then, would cost less, would avoid a large expropriation of land, and would also avoid unnecessary international complications. The Gafni commission, whose conclusions seem naive now, after the passage of years, spoke of making the Neve Ya'akov area a nature preserve. The Jerusalem municipality adopted the decisions of the commission at that time, but the government ministries and the Israel Lands Administration took opposite actions.

Now, with the massive construction in north Jerusalem reaching its culmination, there are already signs on the horizon of the next large Jewish neighborhood going up on territory annexed to the city in 1967; Har Homa, which is meant, according to the planning concept, to create "Jewish urban continuity" between 'Armon

Hanatziv and Gilo. Meanwhile, the plan is stuck in the courts. Today the Har Homa region is covered by a beautiful green forest, which was planted years ago, as Teddy Kollek discovered only recently, to prevent Arab construction on the site. It seems that not only Arabs do political planting.

The struggle over land in Jerusalem has given birth to a new kind of building among the Arabs as well. A few weeks ago, Dr. Yisra'el Kimhi of the Jerusalem Institute wrote, in an article published in honor of 25 years of the unification of Jerusalem, that in certain Arab villages north of the city, a change in the character of construction is taking place and large houses with many floors are multiplying in the villages, houses that sometimes are not inhabited for long periods, evidence that part of this construction is "political."

In his book *Jerusalem: the Struggle for the Form and Appearance of the City*, architect David Karvi'anker delineated the plan of the building of the new neighborhoods in Jerusalem, and wrote that it was carried out in three major stages: "The first stage—erecting the line of northern neighborhoods, which closes the open space between Mount Scopus and the western part of the city, up to the Shmu'el Hanavi' neighborhood; the second stage, erecting the surrounding neighborhoods of Neve Ya'akov, Ramot, Gilo, and 'Armon Hanatziv; the third stage, erecting the neighborhoods in the northern range, between Neve Ya'akov and French Hill." It seems that the fourth chapter in the story of the building of the new Jerusalem is worthy to be crowned with the words: "He who blocks first, [blocks best]." Today, initiative does not belong only to the Israeli establishment. The Arabs initiate projects too, and the decisionmakers in the Jewish sector must take this fact into account as well.

Implications of Falashmura Court Ruling

93AE0306A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jan 93
p B1

[Article by Gid'on Levi; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

On the Way to Normality

The ministerial committee's decision in the case of the Falashmura has given an official seal of approval to the idea that somebody who is not Jewish according to traditional standards has the right to join us, too.

It is easier for us, it seems, to expel 415 Arabs than it is to absorb a few thousand poor Ethiopians. The decision on the expulsion was taken overnight; the decision on whether or not to bring the Falashmura to Israel was made after much soul searching by members of a distinguished commission that sat and pondered the question for weeks.

All the signs point to the fact that the decision finally taken was a case of the lesser of two evils. The Israelis, in any case, accepted it with complete equanimity.

Except that this characteristic equanimity also meant a complete refusal to face the deeper implications of the ministerial commission's decision, which touches far more than the bitter fate of the thousands of Falashmura now doomed to remain in starving Ethiopia. The ministerial committee, headed by Ya'ir Tzaban, perhaps unintentionally, came to a decision last week that will open Israel's way to the normality we have longed for—a little step on the way to finally becoming a nation like all the other nations. It was precisely this partial turning the back on thousands of citizens of Ethiopia, and opening the little aperture for only a few of them to come and join us, which may signal a historical turning point: no longer a "chosen" people for whom only those chosen like them have the right to populate their land, but a well-to-do state of immigrants, strong enough to absorb, even if in a controlled way, immigrants in need, whatever their religion may be. Last week, Israel took a concrete step on this path toward being "like all the other nations."

When we were children in social studies class, we used to ask ourselves all sorts of questions about our crystallizing identity. We were occupied by the question of whom we felt closest to: the young Druze from Dalyat al-Karmel who served in the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces], or the Jewish boy from Brooklyn who sat among the fleshpots. For most of us, there was no question, then—the young Druze who fought by our side was closer to us. This was the first stage on the way to creating our secular Israeli identity. Much water has flowed through the pipes of Dalyat al-Karmel and Brooklyn since then. Some of the Druze have become Israelis like us, others have accepted the Palestinian consciousness; some of the boys from Brooklyn have become more Jewish, while most have turned their backs completely on us and on their Jewishness. Last week, when the ministerial committee made its decision, I remembered this question, for some reason. It is still relevant.

At the head of the immigration authorities of the State of Israel a single authority has stood until now: the chief rabbinate. It alone has decided who is a Jew, and thus it alone has also been the one, based on the Law of Return, who has decided who is qualified to immigrate to this state of immigrants. Formerly there did not seem to be any other way to deal with the *raison d'être* of the state: a national home for the Jewish people, etc. Only a Bosnian child who has the good luck to have been born to a Jewish mother received a visa and aid. Only an Ethiopian who knew something about the Sabbath and the traditions of Kashrut [Jewish dietary laws] received a trailer and the right to vote here. Now Tzaban's ministerial committee has ruled: an end to all that. People who are not Jewish according to the standards of those who head our traditional immigration establishment now also have the right to join.

The immigrants from Operation Solomon and Operation Moses who are Jewish will still have a long and winding path ahead of them until they become Israelis. Most of us see them as completely foreign; not one of us has a single truly Ethiopian friend. Only after they

acquire for themselves—through great effort—our social and cultural customs, will we agree to completely open our doors to them. On the other hand, we have found ourselves much more open to Russian immigrants who are not Jewish: The actress Irina Salaznyova has won prizes and adulation here. She talks like we do, she is pretty like we are, and she is a wonderful actress. And who cares, for heaven's sake, who her mother was? Salaznyova the non-Jew is Israeli in our eyes today much more than Yafet 'Olmo the Ethiopian, chairman of the "Southern Wing to Zion" organization. This is the way things happen in a culture of immigrants.

Now the ministerial committee has come and given the official seal of approval to this healthy trend. We will absorb—not based on the Law of Return—several hundred or thousand Ethiopians who are not recognized as Jews according to the standards an immigration official would go by. We are still speaking of people who may be Jewish, not, God forbid, of "complete goyim." But the center of gravity for classifying immigrants has moved from the rabbinate to the bureaucracy. Now the door is open for similar decisions in the future. It is possible that persecuted Bosnians who ask to immigrate to our country will have to undergo a strict selection by an official whose interest will be not the origin of their mothers, but rather what their professions are, how difficult their situations are, and what contributions they can make to society. It is possible that this will also be the way we will act toward miserable Kurds or Somalis. This is the policy of the countries of the First World.

At any rate, our test of true absorption was never determined by the rabbis; We have always really absorbed only those who learned to be like us and to turn into Israelis like us as quickly as possible: spicing their Hebrew with slang, not speaking it with an accent, smoking on Sabbath eve, being aggressive on the road, and hating those who are different, especially if they are Arabs.

Netanyahu on Political Future

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[Interview with Knesset Member Benjamin Netanyahu by Dan Shilon; place, date not given]

[Text] [Shilon] Bibi Netanyahu, are you looking for a ladder?

[Netanyahu] No, I'm looking for the truth.

[Shilon] While coming down the high tree you climbed?

[Netanyahu] In whatever form. I stand behind everything I've said. I've provided the police with all the information I have and will continue to do so. What's happened here has been an attempt at blackmail accompanied by threats and illegal, clandestine eavesdropping aimed at stealing control of Israel. It must be stopped. I've taken a public stand fully aware that I'll pay a heavy personal price. But I'm satisfied with everything I've done since the moment I received the threat.

[Shilon] Which high-level Likud figure are you accusing of trying to steal control of Israel?

[Netanyahu] I haven't named anyone and I'm not about to do that now. I gave the police the names I had. We're talking about a single cancerous cell that does not represent the Likud in any way.

[Shilon] Is it a high-ranking cancerous cell?

[Netanyahu] I said what I said and I'm not going back on it. Even a small cancerous cell, if it spreads, can kill the entire body. If the Likud doesn't eradicate its appearance within the party at the source, it will never be able to regain the government. This disease has already spread, and it's clear to me now that the phenomenon has existed in a similar form in other segments of the movement as well.

I'm not willing to tolerate such a situation, and not just personally. I'm not willing to see my movement, which I intend to bring back to government, infected by this disease or by these intrigues and crimes. I'm against it and I want the public's support in my efforts.

[Shilon] Even though you have refused to name names, two names were leaked to the media this week. Are they the ones?

[Netanyahu] I won't reveal any fact, any name or any bit of information from the material I handed over to the police.

[Shilon] In your opinion, are [Ya'akov] Bardugo and [Moti] Mish'ani top men in the Likud?

[Netanyahu] I don't want to rate anyone.

[Shilon] Are they suspects?

[Netanyahu] I wish the police investigation success so I won't get into names. I'm not in a symmetrical position with my political opponents, who are trying to trample me and assault my integrity. They certainly have no particularly great interest in seeing the investigation succeed. I'm following the instructions of the police inspector general to say absolutely nothing about the investigation.

[Shilon] Have you received the results of a lie detector test?

[Netanyahu] I'll get all results from the police at the end of the investigation. It must be clear, in any event, that a crime has been committed. Someone invaded my home; he threw a fragmentation grenade at my family as the first step in this blackmail scheme. That was an act of violence meant to rupture my family life. It sure made my wife suffer terribly and caused a great deal of harm to my family. The threat was that photographs would be made public.

I felt that the blackmail had to be stopped immediately and since I'm not a private citizen but a public figure striving to become prime minister, I had to make this matter public and kill the blackmail.

[Shilon] Did the suspects operate on orders from one of the candidates for leadership of the movement?

[Netanyahu] I won't add to what I've said.

[Shilon] But you've pointed a finger at an entire camp and at David Levy, who wants to lead the Likud.

[Netanyahu] Not at all. I haven't pointed a finger at anyone or any camp. I gave the media everything I wanted it to have and all the rest is nothing but rumor and idle talk. Maybe even the rumors are intentional, designed to destroy my credibility.

[Shilon] The police investigation can't take the place of the public test you have to pass. Why is it that you've been hiding behind the police investigation since last Thursday?

[Netanyahu] The fact is that I'm talking with you right now. The most serious of crimes was committed. The crime is so fantastic that it's difficult to keep the public from devouring it. Nothing like this has ever happened to a candidate for prime minister.

[Shilon] It was apparent during your television appearance that you're emotionally distraught. Have you been in full control of everything you've said?

[Netanyahu] I've been in full control of every word I've spoken. I consulted with the finest legal advisers in the country, spoke with my family and talked with others during the 24 hours between the time I received the threat and my television appearance. I knew, and I know with complete confidence, 100 percent, that the threat on me was not an empty one. When I made my decision to appear before the public and tell the truth, I acted with the necessary judgment, firmness and courage.

[Shilon] Actually, you could have foiled the blackmail attempt by going to the police right away instead of appearing on television. That also might have allowed the police to get to the bottom of it more effectively and reach clearer conclusions.

[Netanyahu] I hope the police investigation will remain a quiet one despite the publicity in the media and that none of its material will be leaked to the media.

[Shilon] You're appealing to the man on the street, aren't you?

[Netanyahu] That was one of the considerations in bringing our historic complaint to the police. I didn't want to waste a single moment in putting a stop to the blackmail. I didn't want the blackmailers to have the slightest doubt about their chances of blackmailing me. That's why I went on television. I've been pursuing two parallel courses right from the start, the public one and the police investigation.

[Shilon] Is there really a video tape?

[Netanyahu] I've never used that word. They said it on Army radio. I do know, however, that the blackmail threatens me with sensitive material, including photographs.

[Shilon] Are you certain that such photographs exist?

[Netanyahu] I can't add to what I've said.

[Shilon] Is it possible that the background to the blackmail attempt is criminal rather than political?

[Netanyahu] No.

[Shilon] What's your basis for saying that?

[Netanyahu] Solid information.

[Shilon] Perhaps this was actually a political hoax and you fell into the trap laid for you: you ran to the television studio, which reduced your chances in the political contest.

[Netanyahu] It's no coincidence that all sorts of rumors and accounts have been spread during this affair. I'm confident that the investigation will also be able to take into account the fact that someone is spreading rumors like these.

[Shilon] Aren't you meeting pistol shots with heavy artillery?

[Netanyahu] This didn't involve a pistol. Someone invades your family, throws a bomb like this at it and threatens to show sensitive material to the public; when you have reliable information that this is a serious conspiracy, methodically organized and accompanied by criminal actions every step of the way—that isn't pistol fire but an artillery barrage.

[Shilon] Who is the other woman?

[Netanyahu] I will not give her name.

[Shilon] The names of many women have been mentioned in the media lately; how can you taint them?

[Netanyahu] I'm not responsible for what has been written lately, but I definitely am responsible for the headache my wife has suffered as a result of this incident. We're trying hard to overcome it.

[Shilon] Aren't you sorry now for the American style in which you conducted your campaign for leadership of the movement and the government?

[Netanyahu] No, I think the fact that 250,000 people have signed up for the Likud during a drive that many opposed is proof that the public sees a need to change the electoral system, not just for the Knesset but for the government and within the parties as well.

[Shilon] I wasn't thinking of that. What I mean is that in the United States, the political model you're copying, they're used to nosing around in the bedrooms of candidates for public office. Now it's come back at you like a boomerang.

[Netanyahu] Excuse me, that isn't what happened here. Everyone knows that public figures, like other people, sometimes have family problems or fall on their faces. And that goes for some of history's greatest leaders. Some of them had the most problem-ridden of private lives. It didn't prevent them from being great leaders.

Something else happened in my case. It isn't that my private matters have been exposed but that someone has used personal information for political blackmail. That has never happened even in the United States.

[Shilon] Isn't a candidate's conduct in his personal and family life relevant to the public's election decisions?

[Netanyahu] The public can make up its own mind. I'm not saying that the voter shouldn't take this into consideration but it has to be put into perspective. I think that the public in this country knows the difference between a politician's private life and his performance in office.

[Shilon] What's your response to those who say that cheating on one's lawfully wedded wife also indicates political treachery?

[Netanyahu] I don't think anyone could say such a thing in all seriousness. One Knesset member, Roni Milo, recently said, god forbid we should suspect an army man of betrayal of the state or the service just because he has problems with his wife. They're two completely different realms even if everyone has the right to make a connection between them.

[Shilon] And what about the traditional example that you present in your family behavior?

[Netanyahu] I've never offered my private life as a model to be emulated. I always look with a skeptical eye when someone boasts about his private life. Private life has to remain private.

[Shilon] What do you say to your potential voters who consider the integrity and the sanctity of the family an important component of the web of considerations that go into voting for you?

[Netanyahu] I say to them that they should look at the candidate's record in its totality.

[Shilon] But they want a direct answer to that question.

[Netanyahu] I still say that they should look at the entire record. I also ask them to look at the grave crime that has been committed here and my readiness to come out and fight against it. I'm not asking anyone to justify my personal failing. I myself certainly don't justify it. This is a matter between me and my family.

[Shilon] Can an adulterous prime minister be a good prime minister?

[Netanyahu] Don't ask me to give examples from the recent or distant past, from Israel or other countries. The public well knows the difference between a candidate's private life and his public service. The public knows that it isn't a matter of politicians being holy and pure. It's a matter of people who can slip up.

[Shilon] Is the prime minister, in his private life, permitted to behave like anyone?

[Netanyahu] I don't know what "like anyone" means. It's clear that someone who already holds a position has to think about all the consequences of one act or another.

In any event, I don't hide the fact that I slipped up. And I don't present it as anything less than that.

[Shilon] How, in your opinion, would the late Menachem Begin have reacted to you if he had heard of the affair?

[Netanyahu] I've never thought about it.

[Shilon] If a candidate for prime minister had homosexual tendencies, would you still say that that was his business?

[Netanyahu] That would become the public's business only if the candidate were subject to blackmail. That's exactly the point of my case, which I've succeeded in removing from the agenda. I'm not subject to blackmail. They can't blackmail me.

[Shilon] What do you have against David Levy?

[Netanyahu] That's not the issue. We're political adversaries for leadership of the Likud, nothing more than that.

[Shilon] But you two also have a long history of personal rivalry and mutual displeasure.

[Netanyahu] I've never said anything like that. But ask Mr. Levy. Maybe he acts that way.

[Shilon] What's your answer to people in his camp who accuse you of provocations?

[Netanyahu] Drive!

[Shilon] They contend that you've lost control.

[Netanyahu] Drive!

[Shilon] Do you intend to apologize to them?

[Netanyahu] For what? For the fact that I was a victim of blackmail and took vigorous action to stop it?

[Shilon] That wasn't the first attempt to get you. They also tried to put a black mark on your military record.

[Netanyahu] That was a shocking attempt after the fact, which boomeranged against those who tried it. I believe that the present attempt will also boomerang against the blackmailers. I invite all the slanderers to study my military record until they drop.

[Shilon] As this week comes to an end, is Bibi Netanyahu a wounded man?

[Netanyahu] This wasn't one of the easiest weeks of my life.

[Shilon] Was it a kick in the face?

[Netanyahu] It was hard, very hard. Hard first of all for my wife but hard for me, too.

[Shilon] Can you pick yourself up off the floor?

[Netanyahu] Yes, because I haven't fallen to the floor. In a situation like this, you draw on whatever strength of character you have and remember other crises you've faced in your life.

[Shilon] Have things settled down at home?

[Netanyahu] We're trying hard to overcome it.

[Shilon] Your enemies have already achieved their goal. They succeeded in weakening you.

[Netanyahu] I don't know whether they have weakened me but I'm heartened by the stream of letters I've been receiving from the public and the tremendous encouragement they've given me.

[Shilon] Are there signs that some are abandoning your camp for another?

[Netanyahu] I haven't seen any such signs but I don't entirely rule out the possibility. I feel that I have firm public support. The public isn't as stupid as people think.

[Shilon] After the blackmail attempt is Bibi Netanyahu different from the Netanyahu who started the campaign?

[Netanyahu] I have to be different. No one can go through such experiences unmarked by them in some way.

[Shilon] Have you become less of a person?

[Netanyahu] I've learned more about suffering. I'm more experienced. Despite the information I had, it was difficult for me to believe that such human evil could exist or that someone could sink so low. We all want to believe that there is a limit to depravity. In that sense, I've discovered a gaping abyss of villainy that I'd hoped never to see in this country.

[Shilon] Has something happened to your self-confidence?

[Netanyahu] No, I'm carrying on out of a deep inner sense of conviction.

[Shilon] Even so, you've spoken in this interview in a tone that's more subdued than is usual for you.

[Netanyahu] Maybe it seems that way to you sitting across from me, but if you were to come with me now to an election rally, you would see me as you've seen me in the past.

[Shilon] How far away from you have the leadership of the Likud and the government moved this week?

[Netanyahu] Overall, I don't think a serious change has taken place. My feeling is that the public will come out against the blackmailer rather than the victim.

[Shilon] Bibi Netanyahu, will you someday be prime minister?

[Netanyahu] I believe that I will.

[Shilon] That's the proof that your self-confidence hasn't been shaken.

[Netanyahu] No, it definitely hasn't been shaken.

[Shilon] Thank you.

Possible HABAD Split After 'Messianic' Events

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[Article by Shlomo Shamir]

[Text]

It May Boomerang

Calmer and more clearheaded, away from the glare of media spotlights, the community leaders of the Lubavitcher Rebbe's court in Brooklyn are busy with the interim balance of the "We Want Moshiah [Messiah] Now" campaign. Those who rejected the campaign from the beginning prefer to call it "the damage-and-loss balance." One, a veteran member of the court's secretariat, said yesterday that "the damage is even worse than those who were against declaring the rabbi as Messiah feared it would be." Speaking off the record, veteran HABAD activists said that the campaign to crown the rebbe and the media uproar it has caused, have left the court wounded and humiliated, and—even worse—now in danger of a schism that it will take a great effort to prevent.

For the elderly Hasidim, to whom the rebbe is, above all, their guide in Hasidism and the heir to the teachings of his predecessors, their Hasidism, which, as its name reflects, has always been known for its emphasis on the intellectual and the principles of reason ("Habad" comes from the initials of "Hohma," "Bina," and "Da'at"—"Wisdom," "Understanding," and "Knowledge"), has begun to take on the character of a mystic Messianic movement.

Longing for the Messiah's coming has from its inception been a cornerstone of the Hasidic movement, and its rebbes have never hidden their desire to speed up the redemption. This found expression in their books and Torah lessons. But their approach to the subject was usually very restrained, and kept the rule that you do not take it out into the streets of the city. The Gerer Rebbe, "Admor" ["Our Master, Teacher, and Rabbi"] Yisra'el 'Alter, known as "Bet Yisra'el" after his book of the same name, used to say that "those who talk about the end of days know nothing about it, and those who do know are not talking."

Hasidim have the right to believe that their revered rebbe will bring them redemption and lead them in greeting the Messiah. But the sin of those Lubavitchers who declared their rebbe the "King Messiah" was that they dragged this complicated and emotional topic into the street, and bared it before the masses and the media. A well-known Hasidic rebbe in Brooklyn complained this week, "Have you ever seen a diamond merchant who shouted his wares in a booth in the souk [open-air market]?"

Habad Hasidim, whose slogan is "Bring the Wellsprings Outward," have always made expert use of the media and even aroused bitterness this way from the courts of other Admorim, who prefer that their spiritual activities be mainly directed inwardly. Now a few of the activist

leaders in the Habad movement admit that the courtship of newspapers and television, and the exaggerated attention the movement has given the media, and vice versa, have boomeranged.

"No one has ever dared to attack the image of the rebbe or his standing as a great spiritual leader the way these Hasidim have, they who initiated and carried out the campaign to crown him King Messiah as though they were possessed," a Lubavitcher from Crown Heights complained this week. "I do not understand how we allowed a group of young people to lead the whole movement, even important rabbis, by the nose," he said.

According to stories circulating in the court in Brooklyn, several of the rabbis who signed the proclamation crowning the rebbe as Messiah added their signatures only after threats and warnings. One campaign leader threatened a rabbi of the Lubavitcher movement in Israel, warning that if he did not sign the proclamation, he (the threatener) would stop laying tefillin [placing phylacteries on his arm during daily prayers].

The Hasidim close to the rebbe opposed the campaign, and are now worried mainly over the danger of a schism. It is true that the Messianists did retreat at the last moment from their intention to announce the date the rebbe would reveal himself as the Messiah, and did agree, after much coaxing, to be satisfied with declaring him the Messiah—but Habad Hasidism was exposed as lacking cohesion and discipline, two things that are the foundation of any Hasidic court.

Trying to avoid a schism in the Habad movement, the Hasidim close to the rebbe, along with the secretariat, have already begun a campaign to persuade the Messianists to give up their activities and cease all proclamations or advertisements. Steps are also being considered against those who resist efforts at persuasion and continue to foster the image of the rebbe as Messiah.

The rebbe is under the constant care of a team of physicians, and cannot intervene in what is going on in his court, or answer the wave of letters and requests that come to the secretariat daily. Two of those closest to him, Leyb Gruner and Yehuda Karinski, visit him several times a day and present him with the questions of

the Hasidim, mainly about matchmaking or medical problems. They say that the rebbe answers the questions with a nod of the head. But for some people, that is enough.

A nucleus of zealous Hasidim, known in the court as the "blacks," meet from time to time, mainly after services on the Sabbath, for intimate discussion. One participant told me that the Hasidim bewail their bitter fate, their abandonment without an active leader, and losing their "Oneg Shabbes" [the Joy of the Sabbath: the talk the rebbe used to give every Sabbath after services]. "Now we are like all the other Hasidim in Brooklyn, who rush home after Shabbes services to eat cholent," they lament. They are angry at the way a few members of the secretariat have courted the media, and believe that the newspaper advertisements have cheapened the image of the rebbe, whom they revere as a Tzadik [Hasidic religious leader] and holy man. After THE NEW YORK TIMES "Supplement" published a profile of the Lubavitcher Rebbe in honor of his 90th birthday, the zealots expressed outrage against one man close to the rebbe because this man had cooperated with the journalist.

The Messianists are condemned because their activities have made the question of inheritance, which for loyal Hasidim is basically a taboo, a subject of public discussion. Even in private conversations, Hasidim avoid saying much about the question of who will take the rebbe's place once he "reaches 120." In moments of candor, the names of important Hasidim, or of a few of those close to the rebbe, may come up, but clearly none of them has the rebbe's charisma or his leadership ability.

"Despite all that the Lubavitcher Hasidim say or tell about the rebbe, he is truly a great man, one of the spiritual giants of Hasidism in our times," an expert on Habad Hasidim wrote with some sarcasm not long ago. But it is precisely many of his own Hasidim who lack the tools to appreciate his greatness in Torah. So they are dragged into activities that add nothing to the rebbe's honor. Those close to the rebbe in Brooklyn hope that the gloomy situation the court and the Habad movement are in now can still be reversed.

Uses, Limitations of Initial Loan Package

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p B1

[Article by Judy Meletz; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

What Do You Do With 2 Billion Dollars?

It seems that policymakers are already doubting the market's power to carry out optimal allocation of the loan guarantee funds from the United States.

The campaign to recruit the 2 billion dollars to be covered by the U.S. guarantees went into high gear this week, when senior officials from the finance ministry left for New York to choose undersigners for the bond issue. In March, the finance ministry intends to issue bonds in the American financial market in the range of a billion dollars—covered by the guarantees—and to issue another billion dollars' worth at a later stage this year.

Questions such as how to recruit the money, what kinds of bonds to issue, in what amounts, and under what conditions, are bothering the leaders of the financial establishment in Jerusalem less these days. For such topics, the finance ministry's general accounting branch has plenty of experts who have already proven their ability to get the Israeli Government the very best conditions on the world financial market. And in addition, last week the finance ministry chose the "Morgan Stanley Investment Bank" as special financial adviser for the bond issue.

What could become a bit more controversial is how the recruited funds are to be used once they are in the state coffers. Until recently, economic decisionmakers supported the approach that the free market mechanism should be allowed to determine where the money would go, and that the government should not interfere in its allocation. But over the last few weeks, they have begun to sing a somewhat different tune.

When discussions began a year and a half ago on the Israeli loan request, the heads of the finance ministry and the Bank of Israel had a very simple plan: We will take the money and put it into the Bank of Israel's foreign currency reserves. Because of the expected high growth, investment in the economy will increase, which will then mean more requests for foreign currency to finance imports of equipment and machinery. The business sector will come to the Bank of Israel—as it does every day—and buy foreign currency to finance these purchases. Whoever imports more will buy more foreign currency, and vice versa, and thus the funds from the guarantees will be allocated without any preference going to one sector or another, and without any government interference, but simply following the laws of supply and demand.

The government's role in all of this would be limited to creating microeconomic conditions that would encourage growth: for instance, an exchange-rate policy

that would assure export profitability, reasonable interest rates, and low inflation.

The Americans, of course, loved this approach, for their great fear was that the Israeli Government would take the money, as it has done more than once in the past, and use it to raise the country's standard of living, inflate public services, and increase private and public consumption. So, it was very important to the administration that the Israeli economic leaders understand that this was a case of a state guaranteeing to cover loans, not some kind of grant, and that since the Israeli Government would have to return the money at some stage in the future, with interest and fees, it would have to invest it in projects that would bring in a profit.

Until recently, of course, all the economic policymakers in Jerusalem relied on the thesis that we could depend on the free market to make the optimal allocation of the money from the guarantees. If there were doubters, they dared not raise their voices.

But during the past few weeks, several things have happened from which we can conclude that a certain change in approach has taken place. This change expresses itself in the growing sense that the market mechanism in the Israeli economy is not sophisticated enough to carry out the allocation by itself. And beyond this, the business sector does not have enough initiative to increase its investments at one shot to the tune of 2 billion dollars. So a little direction from above is needed.

The first mention of the subject came from a somewhat unexpected direction—the director of the Bank of Israel, Professor Ya'akov Frankel, one of the most avid supporters of the free market school.

In the plan that he presented several weeks ago for allocation of the guarantee money, Frankel hinted of the possibility of "earmarking" part of the money—not, God forbid, to add to the government's current consumption, but to increase investment in infrastructure and education, and establish special lines of credit for the commercial sector.

Outlined below are the main points of the director's proposal, first presented before the "Economics and Business Club" in Tel Aviv:

- This year, 600 million dollars of the guarantee money would be invested in infrastructure and education. This means about half of the amount set aside for these topics in the 1993 budget proposal. This would allow the government to recruit less money in the local financial market for funding the deficit, and thus ensure low interest rates in the long run.
- Another 600 million dollars would be put at the disposal of financial agents, mainly banks, to provide credit to the business sector. According to the proposal that is crystallizing, this money would be made available through special monthly tenders.
- Another 800 million would be designated for increasing foreign currency reserves, to enable larger sales of dollars to the business sector for funding

purchases of investment assets from imports.

After Frankel presented his proposal, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin also mentioned that Israel will be receiving a considerable sum of money in the next few months, but it still has not been decided how the money is to be used. At the government session two weeks ago, Rabin asked Finance Minister Avraham Shohat to present him "at the earliest possible moment" with a detailed plan for utilization of the guarantees.

From the very fact that the prime minister is asking for a detailed plan, we can conclude that he also does not entirely trust the free-market mechanism, and would prefer that the government be more actively involved in allocating the funds.

A few days ago, finance ministry managing director 'Aharon Vogel met with the prime minister's financial adviser, 'Ilan Fla'to, for the purpose of crystallizing a joint position paper on the topic of utilization of the guarantees. The discussions are expected to continue when Vogel returns from New York at the end of the week.

In the decisionmaking ranks of the economy, a consensus is beginning to be seen—that the guarantee money should not all be put into the Bank of Israel to raise the reserves, as previously suggested, but that at least part of it should be "earmarked" for goals seen as

having the highest national priority, such as increasing investment in infrastructure and education.

A basic question that the decisionmakers will have to consider is whether to use this "earmarked" money for funding projects already included in the state budget for 1993, and in this way enable the government to reduce the scope of its recruitment in the capital market for funding the deficit, or whether it would be preferable to rewrite the budget and enlarge the investments in these projects, in order to spur economic activity.

It is worthwhile to point out that the State of Israel does not have a completely free hand in deciding how to allocate the money from the guarantees. As part of the "implementation agreement" on the subject of the guarantees, signed a month ago with members of the U.S. administration, Israel is forbidden to use the guarantee money to expand current expenditures in the regular budget. Therefore, if she intends to designate part of the funds for budgetary expenditures, she will have to detail precisely how much will go to which branches, and the Americans will surely want to receive regular reports on the subject.

Another limitation included within the "implementation agreement" framework is that the money must not be used for investment in the territories. On this subject at least, the U.S. administration seems less worried today than it was a year ago, when the Likud government was in charge.

Missile Deterrence Doctrine, IAF Alternatives

93WC0018Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Jan 93
p B3

[Article by Aluf Ben]

[Text] Israel's reaction to the Iraqi missile attacks during the Gulf war concluded with warnings whose affects faded under the rain of Scuds. Israel failed to deter Iraq from launching ground-to-ground missiles at population centers. After Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and Haifa were hit, it did nothing.

At the end of the war, the defense establishment was condemned for bungling the buildup of military power. Central to the criticism was the claim that it was doubtful whether Israel had the proper means to strike back at Iraq even if it had wanted to do so. Top commanders feared the political price that Israel would have had to pay for an escalation of hostilities that could have resulted from massive retaliation by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces].

Israel's theory of deterrence is based on the threat of devastating retaliation for any attack on the Israeli rear. Yitzhaq Rabin said during the Gulf war, "We told the Syrians that Damascus would be destroyed if they used ground-to-ground missiles on Tel Aviv. If they fired missiles at Haifa, neither Damascus nor Halab would continue to exist; both would be destroyed." The prime minister and the minister of defense still believe that in an Arab-Israeli war, without the complication of the Gulf war and the American coalition, Israel would need to make clear to the Arabs that any attack on its population centers would be answered with a reply 100 times as powerful on Arab cities.

From information published in Israel and abroad after the Gulf war, and from analysis of comments made by Israel's leaders during the war, it is clear that the IDF presented the political authorities two options for retaliating against Scud attacks:

- Dispatching the Air Force to strike missile launch sites or retaliate against sensitive targets in Iraq. Yitzhaq Shamir, who was prime minister, rejected proposals made by Avihu Bin-Nun, then commander of the Air Force, to send dozens of planes on such a mission. The Americans, who opposed Israeli action, warned against entangling Jordan and Saudi Arabia, through whose skies the Air Force would have had to fly en route to Iraq. Bin-Nun warned during the war that the Jordanian Air Force would "cease to exist" if it interfered with his planes.
- Massive retaliation of another type. Such a drastic reaction would have been considered if Iraq had launched chemical warheads at Israel. The American secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, issued a warning during the war that the Israelis would reply with unconventional weapons if they were attacked with chemicals. When asked about this, Moshe Arens, then Israel's minister of defense, replied, "Saddam Husayn has something to worry about."

Between the conventional option of dropping bombs from planes and the massive response of another sort, there simply were no other means. "For years, we invested billions of dollars in weapons systems but never developed an answer to Scud missiles," confessed a reserve general who for many years was one of the senior officers responsible for setting Israel's defense policy.

Critics have spoken of long-term neglect and contended that the army must provide the political authorities a range of possibilities for retaliation. It is inconceivable, they say, that an Arab state should escape paying a heavy price for an attack on Israel. In their opinion, the Gulf war revealed the limitations of relying on the Air Force as the long arm of the IDF. The use of planes entailed a risk that the pilots would be killed or captured and of possible confrontation with states on the way to Iraq. The Air Force depends on precise, up-to-date intelligence about its targets and a complex system of command and control at a distance of hundreds of kilometers. Airplanes also have difficulty operating at night or in harsh weather. A Scud has no such limitations.

According to this approach, the right answer to Scuds is a weapon just like it: an inexpensive, conventional ground-to-ground missile that can be produced in large numbers—"1,000 little missiles." Defense experts believe that launching such a "terrorist missile" at the capital of Iraq in retaliation for a Scud attack on Tel Aviv would not have resulted in escalation. The political risk involved in using a little missile is far smaller than that of a flight of dozens of attack aircraft over the skies of Baghdad. If the missile is accurate, unlike the Scud and its Iraqi-made progeny, it can threaten sensitive point targets in enemy territory. Israelis remember the bombardment of the Syrian general staff in Damascus during the Yom Kippur War.

The chief critic of the doctrine of reliance on the Air Force and of its shortcomings during the Gulf War is the deputy minister of defense, Gen. (Res.) Yisra'el Tal.

The criticism leveled by Tal and his colleagues has not been wholly accepted in the defense establishment; it arouses resistance from those who believe in the capability of the Air Force and argue that no need exists for any other reply to missile attacks from remote countries. They regard any investment in developing such responses as a waste of money. "If the object is to punish or deter, the Air Force is capable of that mission, as was proved by the strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor," says one, a prominent member of this circle. "We had no reason to think that the Air Force was unable to serve as our long arm."

Air Force proponents say that the air plane is a multi-purpose instrument. It can reach Baghdad, but it will be used in most instances for more important assignments to tip the scales on the battlefield. The "terrorist missile," if the IDF had it, is good for a single target, and there is no assurance that Israel will be subject in the next conflict to the threats it faced in the Gulf War.

In the years before the Gulf war, Israel did not prepare itself to absorb missile attacks from over the horizon. The chief object of war according to defense theory was to defeat the enemy. The strategy was to take the war to the enemy's territory and present such a threat to his vital installations that he would sue for a cease-fire.

This doctrine was suitable for wars against neighboring states. Israel, however, is unable to defeat Iraq, Libya or Iran, which are much farther away. Military history teaches also that it is difficult to deter a distant enemy by conventional means. Rabin can threaten to destroy Syria's cities because they are vulnerable to attack from a distance of a few minutes flying time from central Israel. But the Air Force would face difficulties in exacting a similar price from the Iraqis and maintaining an aggressive presence over its cities for more than a short time. It also is still an open question whether an attack on the enemy's rear acts as a deterrent. Baghdad absorbed many more bombs and missiles during the Gulf war than Tel Aviv, yet the number of Scuds launched did not decrease.

The defense system debated during the 1980s whether to update its defense doctrine, which David Ben-Gurion had fixed during the first years of the state. And if the IDF's multiyear plan of 1986 still did not deal with threats originating from countries farther away than Israel's neighbors, the multiyear plan adopted in 1988 did take into account the threat of missiles launched from periphery states such as Iraq and Libya.

Opponents of the changes in the defense doctrine contend that Israel has no choice but to get used to the existence of a "homefront" and to learn to live with Scuds, at least until the development of effective devices for intercepting them. In their opinion, the Scud is unable to determine the outcome of war; thus, Israel must not be drawn into a contest over terror in its population centers, which would divert its attention from the need to win the war at the front.

Supporters of the policy of "missile against missile" argue that there is no moral drawback in using ground-to-ground missiles for retaliation. In recent years, however, an international norm, based on moral considerations, has evolved against the use of long-range missiles, which it lumps together with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Israeli Government's arms control initiative, proposed by Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres, primarily seeks the removal of missile weapons in

the Middle East. Israel is also a signatory to the international arms inspection treaty, which is designed to prevent the proliferation of missile technology.

Ground-to-ground missiles entered the Middle Eastern arena during the Yom Kippur war. The Syrians fired Frog missiles at the Air Force base at Ramat David, striking towns such as Givat and Migdal Ha'emek in the Jezreel Valley. In retaliation, the Air Force struck targets deep in Syria and Damascus. The Egyptians launched Scud missiles during the Yom Kippur War, aiming for IDF forces in the Sinai and west of the Suez Canal.

In 1975, the United States sent Israel a battery of Lance missiles, which had an operational range of 75 km and carried a conventional warhead. The Lance was incorporated into the artillery corps but was never used and eventually became obsolete. The next stage was delivery of Pershing missiles, with a range up to 750 km, which were promised Israel after the Sinai interim agreements of 1975. The Carter administration, however, froze the deal and it was never fulfilled.

Israel has never admitted possessing long-range missiles. According to foreign reports, Israel has been involved since the early 1960s in developing ground-to-ground missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which the reports dubbed the "Jericho." Development began in cooperation with the French company Desau and continued in Israel after the Six Day War. American documents seized in Iran revealed that former Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizmann stated that the missile went into service in 1970.

According to foreign accounts, Iran signed an agreement in 1977 for joint production of a missile with a range of 500 km and a conventional warhead weighing 750 kg. The deal fell apart after the fall of the shah's regime in 1979. In the 1980s, the foreign media reported that Israel was jointly developing nuclear-armed missiles with South Africa and had jointly tested a missile with a range of 1,400 km in 1989. Late in 1991, Israel pledged to stop exporting missile technology. Richard Clark, then U.S. assistant secretary of state, asserted that he had compelled Israel to sever its ties to South Africa and cancel their joint projects.

Foreign reports further state that two models were developed, one with a range of 500 km and the other with a range of 800 to 1,500 km (the reports vary). During the Gulf war, the Israeli press published a map of the Middle East showing estimated ranges of Iraqi and Israeli missiles. The Israeli missile mentioned in foreign reports looked more menacing on the map but remained in its silo while Iraqi missiles sowed destruction in Israel's cities.


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Regional Affairs

Review of Russian Ambassador's First Year

93AE0306B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Jan 93
p B5

[Article by 'Eyna Shapiro; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

First Year of Getting To Know Each Other

It is not easy to be ambassador in a country to which many of your former countrymen are emigrating, as Russian Ambassador Alexander Bubin has learned. This is the latest stop for the grandson of a priest who died in a labor camp—for someone whose last job was as the senior, and sometimes rebellious, news commentator for IZVESTIA and Soviet television.

When Alexander Yevgenevich Bubin presented his credentials to the president of Israel, he was the first ambassador from the Soviet Union since relations were severed in 1967. A few days later, he had become the last ambassador from the Soviet Union, and the first ambassador from Russia to Israel. This happened last winter, and he has been one of the most colorful and unusual figures on the diplomatic scene here ever since.

We met in his office in the "Textile House" on a windy, rainy evening, the kind of weather he especially likes. "See, this is how we work here, in this little office," said Bubin, sitting behind a big writing desk. Above him hangs the portrait of the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, while the white, light blue, and red Russian flag stretches across the opposite wall.

I ask the ambassador what professional retraining he has needed: Bubin was a top journalist for IZVESTIA and a political commentator for Soviet television. The new situation, he says, requires him to work long hours and learn a great deal. He dedicates long hours to reading on topics related to work. Before he came, he knew the Old and New Testaments rather well, but only here has he learned to completely understand the Jewish people's tie to the sources. Bubin himself is a baptized Christian, but does not believe—a "heretic," as his grandmother called him.

A visit to Jerusalem is not a religious or spiritual experience for him. He reached atheism through intense study and deep thought. His origin is actually from the priestly class: his grandfather was an Orthodox priest in a small town in central Russia near the city of Riazan, and during Stalin's rule he was sent to the labor camps. He did not return. In order not to hurt Alexander Bubin's chances for advancement in the "Workers' and Peasants' State," this fact was hidden from him. He was told that his grandfather had been a janitor in the church.

Bubin did rise to become one of the top journalists in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he was sometimes exiled from the television screen as punishment for stretching the line of "what is permissible" in his commentaries.

He knew the top political leaders firsthand. Brezhnev, he says, was an exceptionally good-hearted man before so much political power was concentrated in his hands; and toward the end he was almost drugged from medicines, and then head of the KGB Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov were effectively the ones running the country.

From his job on IZVESTIA, he moved on to serve as ambassador to Israel. Now his routine is, of course, very different. "The first year of Russian-Israeli relations was a year of getting to know each other," says Bubin. "Russia, which is not yet quite on Israel's side, has begun to understand Israel; and Israel, although not of Russian origin, is beginning to discover Russia. From the diplomatic point of view, this has been a successful year. The embassy has developed good relations with the Israeli foreign ministry and the other ministries." But on the nonprofessional, human level, Ambassador Bubin has had quite a few surprises. "Let us begin with the fact that before I arrived I imagined to myself that Israel would be a much more Western country. This stands out especially in daily life. Often we run into lack of precision here, obligations not carried out, carelessness." Is this the famous "Levantine Spirit," he wonders, or perhaps the "Socialist Spirit"? Is it homemade, or imported from his homeland? And the delays! No event ever starts on time!

He was also surprised by the strength of the longing and nostalgia that immigrants have for Mother Russia, even though she treated them like stepchildren—otherwise, he says, they surely would not have left her. They like to speak Russian, write songs of yearning for Russia, and feel her pain; and Bubin, who often wanders around the country and meets people, feels the unavoidable human tragedy that comes with each wave of immigration. People turn to him for help, look to him with hope—despite the fact that there is no way he can help. The ambassador, of course, cannot interfere in the internal affairs of Israel, but in his talks with politicians, he regularly raises the topic of absorption. He is answered with understanding, but nothing really changes.

He is also helpless to fulfill requests that come to him at the right address, like requests from immigrants about their pension money from Russia. For Russia has continued the Soviet tradition of not paying to pensioners who have left the state what is due them. Bubin has recommended to his superiors that the unfair practice be changed, and in Moscow they understand the need for this, but the condition of the Russian treasury makes it impossible.

The financial situation in Russia also affects the embassy. The ambassador makes do with a Volvo instead of the Mercedes that would be appropriate for someone of his rank. Funding for embassy activities actually comes from Jews, all those hundreds of thousands who come to the embassy with requests for routine services that are given in return for payment, like visas or passport extensions. But Bubin fears that with the

opening of the Ukraine's and Belarus's independent embassies, the Russian Embassy's financial situation will become even worse.

There have been many rumors lately that Bubin may be removed from his post, as part of the replacement of Gorbachev's men with Yeltsin's. Is he packing his suitcases, then? "The situation at the top of the political spectrum in Russia is very complicated; there are many hidden factors, and anything that is not entirely against the laws of physics could happen."

Bubin has not officially heard that he is to leave his job, but adds that if the new Russian Government changes its policy, he will have to resign, for he is able to further only a policy he believes in. He does not think that the rumors of his firing are because of his pro-Israeli views, so unlike the traditional pro-Arab atmosphere in the halls of the foreign ministry in Moscow. "It does not matter to me how I seem to others. As Rabbi Zusya of Anipoli said: When I stand before God on the Day of Judgment, he will not ask me why I was not Abraham or Jacob or Moses; he will ask me why I was not Zusya. And this is exactly what it is all about," says Bubin. "I always try to remain myself, to be faithful to my beliefs. My beliefs about the situation in the Near East and the Arab-Israeli conflict have always been more objective than is customary among us. I was the first who openly brought up the need to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Against such a background of pro-Arab policy and propaganda, this approach was interpreted as pro-Israeli. Really, it is a pro-Russian stand, for it serves Russia's interests in the international arena. There is no doubt that good relations with both Israel and the Arabs will serve my country's interests."

Clearly, this change in policy has not been accepted with favor by certain Arab states, or by the Palestinians, but Bubin hopes that this is a temporary phenomenon, and that a situation will develop that will satisfy everyone. The ambassador has met with Faysal Huseyni, and if necessary, he is ready to meet with him again. In response to the terrorist activity and the expulsion of the Hamas leaders, he says, "My reactions as an individual and as Russian ambassador are exactly the same. I am against all forms of terrorist activity. This is the position of my government. The Government of Russia opposes the expulsion, and believes that no punitive act will uproot the terror. The solution to the problem is a comprehensive political settlement."

Responding to the suggestion that many officials in the Russian foreign ministry have a pro-Arab orientation, the ambassador says that these workers come from an Arabist background from the point of view of their higher education, diplomatic experience, and political education. "But," he adds, "new times, new songs." He starts from the basic assumption that the Russian foreign ministry does not serve the interests of either Arabs or Israelis, but rather the vital interests of Russia. The workers in the embassy here in Israel are also Arabists, but Bubin does not think they have an outstandingly pro-Arab orientation.

I tell him about the diplomat from the Canadian Embassy who, before accepting an invitation to visit our home in Jerusalem, clarified whether we live in a neighborhood within the green line. Ambassador Bubin does not do that. After one of his visits across the green line, the PLO representative in Moscow presented a complaint to the foreign ministry, and they answered her, "Please do not mix geography with politics!"

How will the second year of relations between Russia and Israel look? Ambassador Bubin has clear answers. This year, we will need to build a firm legal basis for relations between the two countries. Agreements are waiting to be signed between the two nations in all sorts of areas: trade, investment, science, culture, education. Some of the agreements will already be signed during Prime Minister Rabin's visit to Moscow. There is also another very practical problem to be worked out between Israel and Russia—the problem of dual citizenship. Usually the attitude of governments toward dual citizenship is cool, but in this case, we are speaking not of a political question, but a humanitarian problem, and the ambassador recommends to the two governments that they look at it from that point of view.

Bubin prefers to meet his diplomatic colleagues privately rather than at receptions, for only thus is it possible to talk about things that are really essential. The lack of a tie around his neck, he does not see as breaking with convention, but explains it rather as due to his conservative habits. "In diplomacy, style is dictated by the relationship between outward form and content. In the diplomatic times of Talleyrand, Disraeli, and Prince Gorchakov, outward manners were respected no less than was content. In the 20th century, content pushes outward form aside, and I hope that diplomacy will continue to develop in this direction."

EC Official in Occupied Territories on Peace Process

93BR7060A Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French
1 Feb 93 p 6

[Interview with Tomas Dupla, Spaniard, EC Commission representative to the occupied territories, by Robert Verdussen; place and date not given: "Tomas Dupla: 'The EC Is Not Bringing Its Weight To Bear in the Middle East'"]

[Text] "The Palestinians feel that the European Community should put pressure on Israel and that it is not bringing its weight to bear in the Middle East."

Tomas Dupla is the European Commission representative to the occupied territories. The post was created in September 1991 and is the equivalent of the Commission representation to Israel, a post filled by the Belgian Albert Maes (see: LA LIBRE BELGIQUE of 25 January). However, while Mr. Maes works in Tel Aviv, Tomas Dupla is forced to live in Brussels. "That's the problem, because normally I would be living in the occupied territories," he says. Negotiations with the

Israeli authorities recently led to an agreement: Mr. Dupla hopes to be able to move to Jerusalem after the summer.

Large Program

According to the high-level Spanish official, "my mission consists of facilitating the dispatch of Community aid to the occupied territories. The European program is relatively large, with a per capita amount that is undoubtedly the highest in the Mediterranean. There are many projects and it is necessary to have someone on site."

One of Mr. Dupla's other missions is to export Palestinian products abroad, with all the technical assistance that this implies. Is this a sort of ambassador's role?

"No. The occupied territories are not a sovereign state. They do not have a government," says the Commission representative "This rules out a large proportion of the traditional work of an ambassador. But this situation makes it all the more difficult to dispatch aid."

Consequently, the main difficulty facing Mr. Dupla lies in the absence of institutions. Who are his dialogue partners?

With Whom?

"The Palestinians in general. I do not have a clearly designated dialogue partner because there has never been a state. However, there are political groups and institutions which, legally speaking, are considered private institutions. So I have contacts with those that have a national outlook." Apart from contacts concerning the problem of his residency, Mr. Dupla has no contact with the Israeli authorities, "because, from the Community's point of view, Israel and the occupied territories constitute two different political entities—apart from the de facto control imposed by the occupation."

As a result, political problems are a major source of interference in the Commission representative's work. The decision to allocate Community aid to the occupied territories was made on humanitarian grounds, but is clearly not exempt from political aims, which are to be viewed within the broader situation in the Middle East, since it is the Palestinians who are at the center of it. "The Gulf war, the peace process, and the deportees issue have all had an impact on Community aid, whether in the choice of projects or their execution," explains Mr. Dupla.

Contributing Toward Peace

Adopting a broader view, we could say that Dupla's mission consists of contributing toward peace by means of economic development. "The Palestinians have a positive perception of Community aid," he says. "From the political point of view, they feel that the Community is slightly more favorable toward Israel, whereas the Israelis feel that the Community is completely pro-Palestinian. This probably means that our position is balanced."

Mr. Dupla has no contact with the Islamic Hamas movement, whose militants were deported to southern Lebanon, "because Hamas is a military organization and economic development has nothing to do with Islamic resistance. However, if we do have contacts with people linked to Hamas, it is to the extent that the Community obviously does not exclude Muslims since they comprise the vast majority of the Palestinian population. These contacts are linked to Islamic universities or hospitals."

Strategy for Disarming Middle East

93WC0015Z Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Jan 93
p B2

[Article by General Ben; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

How To Demilitarize the Region

The Egyptians are no longer satisfied with calling for the dismantling of nuclear weapons—they also want to halt the race for high-tech armaments and the Israeli plan for development and launching of photography satellites.

The Israeli proposal for demilitarization of the Near East, presented the day before yesterday as part of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres's speech at the signing ceremony for the "International Treaty for the Liquidation of Chemical Weapons," was a landmark in the development of contacts towards arms control in the region. In the view of Dr. Shai Feldman of the Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, arms control has its place in Israeli defense policy and finds expression in the decisions the Rabin government has made.

In the six months that have passed since the change of administration in Jerusalem, the government has broken barriers it inherited from its predecessors, and decided to sign the "Chemical Weapons Liquidation Treaty" unconditionally; to agree to EC participation in the multilateral talks on arms control; to carry on a direct dialogue with Egypt on this subject; and to announce an official Israeli policy on arms control, in the form of a statement of objectives presented by Peres.

Israel's opponent at the arms control talks is Egypt, which over the last few years has been conducting a stubborn diplomatic fight to clear the region of nuclear weapons. The Egyptians have not hidden the fact that they intend first of all to have the atomic reactor at Dimona closed down. The Egyptian defense minister, Muhammad Sa'id Tantawi, said a month and a half ago that the unconventional weapons in Israel's hands threaten the security of his country—along with Iranian fundamentalism.

Last week, a retired Egyptian general visited Israel, and appeared at the conference on arms control at Kibbutz Ginosar's Center for Strategic Studies. The general presented in detail the Egyptian position on arms control negotiations. The proposals from Cairo seem like a reverse image of the Israeli defense perception. Almost every paragraph was meant to neutralize another of the

components of Israel's might, under the banner of "balance of power" among the states in the region.

The Egyptians presented a three-stage plan for regional arms control:

- Learning from the experience of the great powers, and of other states outside the Near East, and clarifying the positions of the sides in the region (as of now, the multilateral talks are mentioned at this stage).
- Public declaration by the sides of the steps they are ready to take in the arms control process (the sides committing themselves to present their statements of objectives before the next round of talks).
- Practical steps to limit arms build-up and cut down current stocks, according to an agreed order of priorities.

At the head of the Egyptian order of priorities stands dismantling of nuclear arms. "On this subject, our positions are completely at odds," the general says. "Israel insists on keeping her nuclear arsenal complete, and wants its continued existence written into any future agreement. The Egyptians and Arabs want to remove all nuclear arms from the region and to create a region free of weapons of mass destruction."

The general made it clear that any agreement that does not solve the nuclear question cannot provide a stable and lasting peace. The sides that do not have nuclear weapons will try to achieve a similar option, in order to reduce the threat. Liquidation of the weapons of mass destruction will increase security and trust among the sides, and deepen the peace.

In his words, even after the removal of nuclear weapons from the Near East, Israel will still have a clear advantage over the Arabs. In her hands will remain the infrastructure and knowledge to construct the nuclear weapons anew at any time, and the Egyptians see this as a deterrent force in itself.

After nuclear weapons, the Egyptians want to halt the race for advanced technological armaments and their military applications in space. Israeli experts believe that this proposal is intended to curb the technological potential of the defense industry, which gives the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] an advantage over the weapons systems the Arabs possess. Egypt also opposes the Israeli plan for developing and launching photography satellites into space, something that Israel sees as very important for strengthening the intelligence deterrent. "Israel worries greatly about surprise attacks, but nobody thinks of initiating such an offensive any more," the Egyptian general said, "Today, we are using the peace offensive President Sadat used in 1977."

Egypt proposes that the great conventional armies, which Israel sees as the main threat to her security, be reduced in the final stage of the process.

The Egyptian general says that the goal of the arms control process is "to achieve a higher level of national security for all the states, with the lowest possible level of

armaments. In the Near East of the future, stability will be achieved through political and economic means, not by use of arms."

But, in his words, there is no point in talking about smaller armies before peace agreements and stability are achieved.

Effective reduction of armies depends, in his words, on four conditions:

- Balance in the size and quality of armies and defense industries
- Achievement of security through an agreed-upon political solution, without military supremacy
- Existence of an effective supervisory force
- Inclusion of all states in the region in the process, without distinction or discrimination

The basic principle in reduction of armaments is readiness of the sides to reveal their military capacity, especially in the realms of nuclear science, advanced technology, and satellites.

Israel strongly opposes the idea of balance of technical force, because its military superiority is meant to compensate for its overwhelming numerical inferiority compared to the Arab world. It also demands that arms control talks be linked to progress in the peace negotiations, and asserts that demilitarization will be possible only after peace is achieved. The Israelis agree with the Egyptians that all states of the region should be included in any future arrangement, if it is to be viable.

In the arms control talks, Israel's representatives suggested learning from the experience of the great powers, and beginning the process with first steps toward building trust and easing tensions, such as advance announcements of military exercises, direct contact between commanders, and jointly dealing with sea or air disasters. The Egyptian viewpoint is the opposite. The Arabs oppose any direct contact between the armies that might be interpreted as recognizing Israel's legitimacy before peace agreements are finalized.

"Israel puts the emphasis on technical aspects of building trust, which the Arabs are not ready for," said the general. "In Egypt, we do not separate the building of trust and the control of arms. The two should exist concurrently, not separately."

During the latest round of arms control talks, held in Moscow in September, the Egyptian delegates suggested that Israel sign the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," a treaty that Israel strongly opposes. "We already have a peace agreement and mutual trust," the Egyptians explained, "and the treaty would be suitable as a apparatus for extending this trust and security to the rest of the region."

The Egyptians say that the tools suitable for building trust are public declarations by the sides taking part in the talks concerning the steps they are ready to take in the arms control process, such as participation in international treaties and reduction in the size of armies, and

on their order of priorities. Such declarations express the political will of the governments involved in the process, and in the Egyptian opinion, every practical step begins with a political decision.

This week Egypt played the stubborn role, which Israel usually plays. Cairo joined the Arab bloc in refusing to sign the "Chemical Weapons Liquidation Treaty," which Israel has accepted. The Arabs demand that Israel sign the nuclear treaty as a condition for their participation in the chemical treaty. On the eve of his leaving for Paris to sign the chemical treaty, Peres used the opportunity for a diplomatic exercise: he called the Egyptian foreign minister, 'Amr Musa, and read him the Israel demilitarization program.

The game of cat and mouse between Israel and Egypt can be expected to continue in the years to come, and even to worsen, before arrangements on arms control are reached. The next round of multilateral talks is planned to be held in Washington on 9 February. All the sides are waiting for Bill Clinton's administration to come into office. According to the new president's early statements, he will speed up the arms control talks and the efforts to prevent the spread of unconventional weapons.

Internal Affairs

Plans To Expropriate Land in North Jerusalem

93AE0306D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Jan 93
p B2

[Article by Nadav Shraga'i; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

The Disputed Lands in North Jerusalem

From the beginning, building Jewish neighborhoods in post-1967 Jerusalem has been a political issue. When the Arabs did not sell their lands willingly, the lands were expropriated. This did not prevent the Arabs from continuing to do plenty of building—just without licenses. A new expropriation is on the agenda, the largest since 1980.

In 1967, the Government of Israel, then headed by Levi 'Eshkol, tried to avoid expropriating lands from the Arabs in Jerusalem. In those days, there was a debate in the government between those siding with expropriation and those who were against it. Against this background, an interesting trial was made, which lasted several months: the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs made the secret decision to set up a company to act as a front for the government and serve as middleman between Arab land owners and Jewish entrepreneurs. The intention was to transfer as much land as possible to Jews and erect Jewish settlements on them, in order to establish political facts that would make the redivision of Jerusalem impossible. The Arabs, to the disappointment of those ministers who opposed expropriation, were not seduced. They well understood what was hidden behind the business exterior, and refused to

sell their lands. After a few months, the company was dismantled, and a great wave of expropriations began.

A total of 17,000 dunams were expropriated in the first years after the Six-Day War, at the Ma'arakh government's initiative. About a third of the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem—140,000 people—live on these lands today, in a string of new neighborhoods along the jurisdictional line. Neve Ya'akov, Ramot, 'Armon Hanatziv, Gilo, Ramot 'Eshkol, Sanhedria Hamurhevet, Giv'at Hamivtar, French Hill, and Pisgat Z'ev, are all built on the territory annexed to the State of Israel after the Six-Day War, south, east, and also north of the old jurisdictional borders (Jerusalem's territory of jurisdiction was tripled in 1967, from 38,000 dunams to about 110,000 dunams).

Against this background, it seems that the dimensions of the territory, which the municipality of Jerusalem recently recommended that the Housing Ministry expropriate from Arabs in north Jerusalem—800 dunams, on which another Jewish neighborhood will arise between Pisgat Z'ev and French Hill—are not large relative to what has already been expropriated from the Arabs in the city since 1967. The surprise perhaps stems from the timing, and also from the fact that the mayor, Teddy Kollek, was apparently not aware that planning the territory as a new Jewish neighborhood involved expropriating land from Arabs. To tell the truth, expropriation of private lands to create political facts in the capital seems like something from another era. Except for one large expropriation in 1980—4,600 dunams between Neve Ya'akov and French Hill, on which the various Pisgat Z'ev developments were built—the majority of the expropriations were carried out in the first few years after the Six-Day War.

Contacts concerning the plan mentioned above—with outgoing Minister of Housing Ariel Sharon and, more recently, with Minister of Housing Binyamin Ben-Eliezer—even more than they testify to the rather naive faith that the story would not be leaked, testify to the difficult and protracted struggle going on over the vacant lands and various developments in east Jerusalem, between the various branches of the Israeli establishment and the Arab residents of east Jerusalem, backed by their nationalist institutions.

The Jewish settlement in east Jerusalem after 1967 was political from the beginning. The guiding rule was not to settle in areas heavily populated by Arabs. The "bible" of Israeli policy in the territories annexed to Jerusalem was more or less based on one paragraph of the decision of the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs, which set as a "national goal" the guarding of the existing ratio between the Jewish and Arab populations—about 78 percent to 22 percent. This has been at the expense of the Arab population of the city. Its growth rate has been higher over the years than that of the Jewish population, but in spite of this, many fewer housing units have been built for Arabs than have been built for Jews.

Until 1983, almost no construction projects were authorized for Arabs in east Jerusalem. Just a year ago, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies determined that this policy was deliberate. The research team of the institute (which includes Teddy Kollek among its founders) determined that "The Israeli staff had trouble agreeing on the best planning concept, and for political reasons put off preparing a descriptive program or detailed plans until 1983...the root of the problem was the desire to protect the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, and from this grew the trend not to authorize Arab construction on a large scale. Behind this policy was the misguided basic assumption that lack of planning and not giving building licenses would lessen the extent of construction in the Arab sector, but reality has proven that Arab building has not been stopped. It has continued to develop, both within the city and outside of it...."

Without organized planning, most of the building projects in east Jerusalem were allowed according to an arrangement based on Paragraph 78 of the "Law of Planning and Construction." Building permits of this kind, originally meant to solve short-term ad hoc problems until organized plans could be prepared, were passed out almost wholesale by the Jerusalem municipality, from Kafr 'Akav in the north to Tzur Ba'hr in the south. At the same time, the Israeli policy also gave birth to illegal Arab construction on a large scale, which the municipality and the interior ministry had difficulty controlling. What made the Israeli administration's frustration worse was the fact that the built-up area in the Arab settlements grew over the years with no connection to the growth of the population itself. Studies and aerial photographs show that in the years 1967-84 alone, the built-up areas in the Arab settlements in the Jerusalem region grew at a rate of 119 percent, while population grew by no more than a few dozen percentage points.

The extensive taking of land by the Arabs, who have built low, wide, and scattered, has found its expression mainly in north Jerusalem. On a mountainside north of the city, on the main Jerusalem-Ramallah road, lie the town of 'Al Bira and the settlements Shu'afat, 'A-Ram, Kafr 'Akav, 'Atarot, and Kalandia. In these settlements, located partly within the Jerusalem jurisdictional borders, there were until about a year ago some 3,500 structures over and above the 1,500 that existed there in 1967. The sources of funding for the fast rising, unregulated Arab construction were varied, from Jordan or the Persian Gulf States to the PLO and private funds.

In the late 1970s, it seemed to the government that the Arab population was threatening to close off the Jewish option between the northernmost neighborhood of Jerusalem, Neve Ya'akov, and French Hill to the south of it. Highways that had been planned were being blocked by Arab construction, and territory that had been earmarked for Jewish construction was taken up by Arabs. It was therefore decided to expropriate 4,600 dunams between the two neighborhoods, and in time Pisgat Z'ev was built on this land. David Levi and Yig'al

Horovitz were the architects of this expropriation, which created a great storm. Teddy Kollek supported the action, but attacked the timing—in a way, incidentally, amazingly similar to the form of the announcement he made this week about the plan his professionals have finalized for the planning and expropriation of 800 additional dunams in the same area.

In a colloquium Kollek took part in back then, together with Meron Benvenisti and the late MAPAM [United Workers Party] leader, Ya'akov Hazan, he explained in principle his support of the expropriations: "Jerusalem should be built in a way that makes it impossible to divide her again. Without expropriation of land, tens of thousands of Jews would not be living in the new neighborhoods today. There was no other choice than to take this action. We tried to take territory in the western part of the city and give it to the Arabs, but to my sorrow, we did not succeed in convincing even one of the necessity of this move, and even if we had convinced them, it would not have been enough to ease the feelings of the Arabs toward us after the expropriation."

The incentive for expropriating another 800 dunams south of the territory that was expropriated in 1980 was born of similar circumstances: the fear that an Arab wedge would be driven in between Pisgat Z'ev and French Hill, against a background of what seemed to the authorities in Jerusalem like further danger of Arab obstruction. The accelerated Jewish construction in the north Jerusalem region in the last few years, and the construction that will be carried out there in the next few years, put an effectual end to a basic debate that had gone on over two approaches, each of which supported a different concept of the direction development in Jerusalem should take.

Housing Ministry representatives said after the Six-Day War that most of the work of expropriation and development would have to be done in the southern part of the city, with the goal of connecting Jerusalem and Bethlehem. In the mid-1970s, a commission headed by 'Arnon Gafni, former managing director of the Finance Ministry, presented to the Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem Affairs a series of recommendations, the most important of which was a plan for extending Jerusalem's territory, especially southward. This extension, the committee explained then, would cost less, would avoid a large expropriation of land, and would also avoid unnecessary international complications. The Gafni commission, whose conclusions seem naive now, after the passage of years, spoke of making the Neve Ya'akov area a nature preserve. The Jerusalem municipality adopted the decisions of the commission at that time, but the government ministries and the Israel Lands Administration took opposite actions.

Now, with the massive construction in north Jerusalem reaching its culmination, there are already signs on the horizon of the next large Jewish neighborhood going up on territory annexed to the city in 1967; Har Homa, which is meant, according to the planning concept, to create "Jewish urban continuity" between 'Armon

Hanatziv and Gilo. Meanwhile, the plan is stuck in the courts. Today the Har Homa region is covered by a beautiful green forest, which was planted years ago, as Teddy Kollek discovered only recently, to prevent Arab construction on the site. It seems that not only Arabs do political planting.

The struggle over land in Jerusalem has given birth to a new kind of building among the Arabs as well. A few weeks ago, Dr. Yisra'el Kimhi of the Jerusalem Institute wrote, in an article published in honor of 25 years of the unification of Jerusalem, that in certain Arab villages north of the city, a change in the character of construction is taking place and large houses with many floors are multiplying in the villages, houses that sometimes are not inhabited for long periods, evidence that part of this construction is "political."

In his book *Jerusalem: the Struggle for the Form and Appearance of the City*, architect David Karvi'ankel delineated the plan of the building of the new neighborhoods in Jerusalem, and wrote that it was carried out in three major stages: "The first stage—erecting the line of northern neighborhoods, which closes the open space between Mount Scopus and the western part of the city, up to the Shmu'el Hanavi' neighborhood; the second stage, erecting the surrounding neighborhoods of Neve Ya'akov, Ramot, Gilo, and 'Armon Hanatziv; the third stage, erecting the neighborhoods in the northern range, between Neve Ya'akov and French Hill." It seems that the fourth chapter in the story of the building of the new Jerusalem is worthy to be crowned with the words: "He who blocks first, [blocks best]." Today, initiative does not belong only to the Israeli establishment. The Arabs initiate projects too, and the decisionmakers in the Jewish sector must take this fact into account as well.

Implications of Falashmura Court Ruling

93AE0306A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jan 93
p B1

[Article by Gid'on Levi; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

On the Way to Normality

The ministerial committee's decision in the case of the Falashmura has given an official seal of approval to the idea that somebody who is not Jewish according to traditional standards has the right to join us, too.

It is easier for us, it seems, to expel 415 Arabs than it is to absorb a few thousand poor Ethiopians. The decision on the expulsion was taken overnight; the decision on whether or not to bring the Falashmura to Israel was made after much soul searching by members of a distinguished commission that sat and pondered the question for weeks.

All the signs point to the fact that the decision finally taken was a case of the lesser of two evils. The Israelis, in any case, accepted it with complete equanimity.

Except that this characteristic equanimity also meant a complete refusal to face the deeper implications of the ministerial commission's decision, which touches far more than the bitter fate of the thousands of Falashmura now doomed to remain in starving Ethiopia. The ministerial committee, headed by Ya'ir Tzaban, perhaps unintentionally, came to a decision last week that will open Israel's way to the normality we have longed for—a little step on the way to finally becoming a nation like all the other nations. It was precisely this partial turning the back on thousands of citizens of Ethiopia, and opening the little aperture for only a few of them to come and join us, which may signal a historical turning point: no longer a "chosen" people for whom only those chosen like them have the right to populate their land, but a well-to-do state of immigrants, strong enough to absorb, even if in a controlled way, immigrants in need, whatever their religion may be. Last week, Israel took a concrete step on this path toward being "like all the other nations."

When we were children in social studies class, we used to ask ourselves all sorts of questions about our crystallizing identity. We were occupied by the question of whom we felt closest to: the young Druze from Dalyat al-Karmel who served in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], or the Jewish boy from Brooklyn who sat among the fleshpots. For most of us, there was no question, then—the young Druze who fought by our side was closer to us. This was the first stage on the way to creating our secular Israeli identity. Much water has flowed through the pipes of Dalyat al-Karmel and Brooklyn since then. Some of the Druze have become Israelis like us, others have accepted the Palestinian consciousness; some of the boys from Brooklyn have become more Jewish, while most have turned their backs completely on us and on their Jewishness. Last week, when the ministerial committee made its decision, I remembered this question, for some reason. It is still relevant.

At the head of the immigration authorities of the State of Israel a single authority has stood until now: the chief rabbinate. It alone has decided who is a Jew, and thus it alone has also been the one, based on the Law of Return, who has decided who is qualified to immigrate to this state of immigrants. Formerly there did not seem to be any other way to deal with the *raison d'être* of the state: a national home for the Jewish people, etc. Only a Bosnian child who has the good luck to have been born to a Jewish mother received a visa and aid. Only an Ethiopian who knew something about the Sabbath and the traditions of Kashrut [Jewish dietary laws] received a trailer and the right to vote here. Now Tzaban's ministerial committee has ruled: an end to all that. People who are not Jewish according to the standards of those who head our traditional immigration establishment now also have the right to join.

The immigrants from Operation Solomon and Operation Moses who are Jewish will still have a long and winding path ahead of them until they become Israelis. Most of us see them as completely foreign; not one of us has a single truly Ethiopian friend. Only after they

acquire for themselves—through great effort—our social and cultural customs, will we agree to completely open our doors to them. On the other hand, we have found ourselves much more open to Russian immigrants who are not Jewish: The actress Irina Salaznyova has won prizes and adulation here. She talks like we do, she is pretty like we are, and she is a wonderful actress. And who cares, for heaven's sake, who her mother was? Salaznyova the non-Jew is Israeli in our eyes today much more than Yafet 'Olmo the Ethiopian, chairman of the "Southern Wing to Zion" organization. This is the way things happen in a culture of immigrants.

Now the ministerial committee has come and given the official seal of approval to this healthy trend. We will absorb—not based on the Law of Return—several hundred or thousand Ethiopians who are not recognized as Jews according to the standards an immigration official would go by. We are still speaking of people who may be Jewish, not, God forbid, of "complete goyim." But the center of gravity for classifying immigrants has moved from the rabbinate to the bureaucracy. Now the door is open for similar decisions in the future. It is possible that persecuted Bosnians who ask to immigrate to our country will have to undergo a strict selection by an official whose interest will be not the origin of their mothers, but rather what their professions are, how difficult their situations are, and what contributions they can make to society. It is possible that this will also be the way we will act toward miserable Kurds or Somalis. This is the policy of the countries of the First World.

At any rate, our test of true absorption was never determined by the rabbis; We have always really absorbed only those who learned to be like us and to turn into Israelis like us as quickly as possible: spicing their Hebrew with slang, not speaking it with an accent, smoking on Sabbath eve, being aggressive on the road, and hating those who are different, especially if they are Arabs.

Netanyahu on Political Future

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[Interview with Knesset Member Benjamin Netanyahu by Dan Shilon; place, date not given]

[Text] [Shilon] Bibi Netanyahu, are you looking for a ladder?

[Netanyahu] No, I'm looking for the truth.

[Shilon] While coming down the high tree you climbed?

[Netanyahu] In whatever form. I stand behind everything I've said. I've provided the police with all the information I have and will continue to do so. What's happened here has been an attempt at blackmail accompanied by threats and illegal, clandestine eavesdropping aimed at stealing control of Israel. It must be stopped. I've taken a public stand fully aware that I'll pay a heavy personal price. But I'm satisfied with everything I've done since the moment I received the threat.

[Shilon] Which high-level Likud figure are you accusing of trying to steal control of Israel?

[Netanyahu] I haven't named anyone and I'm not about to do that now. I gave the police the names I had. We're talking about a single cancerous cell that does not represent the Likud in any way.

[Shilon] Is it a high-ranking cancerous cell?

[Netanyahu] I said what I said and I'm not going back on it. Even a small cancerous cell, if it spreads, can kill the entire body. If the Likud doesn't eradicate its appearance within the party at the source, it will never be able to regain the government. This disease has already spread, and it's clear to me now that the phenomenon has existed in a similar form in other segments of the movement as well.

I'm not willing to tolerate such a situation, and not just personally. I'm not willing to see my movement, which I intend to bring back to government, infected by this disease or by these intrigues and crimes. I'm against it and I want the public's support in my efforts.

[Shilon] Even though you have refused to name names, two names were leaked to the media this week. Are they the ones?

[Netanyahu] I won't reveal any fact, any name or any bit of information from the material I handed over to the police.

[Shilon] In your opinion, are [Ya'akov] Bardugo and [Moti] Mish'ani top men in the Likud?

[Netanyahu] I don't want to rate anyone.

[Shilon] Are they suspects?

[Netanyahu] I wish the police investigation success so I won't get into names. I'm not in a symmetrical position with my political opponents, who are trying to trample me and assault my integrity. They certainly have no particularly great interest in seeing the investigation succeed. I'm following the instructions of the police inspector general to say absolutely nothing about the investigation.

[Shilon] Have you received the results of a lie detector test?

[Netanyahu] I'll get all results from the police at the end of the investigation. It must be clear, in any event, that a crime has been committed. Someone invaded my home; he threw a fragmentation grenade at my family as the first step in this blackmail scheme. That was an act of violence meant to rupture my family life. It sure made my wife suffer terribly and caused a great deal of harm to my family. The threat was that photographs would be made public.

I felt that the blackmail had to be stopped immediately and since I'm not a private citizen but a public figure striving to become prime minister, I had to make this matter public and kill the blackmail.

[Shilon] Did the suspects operate on orders from one of the candidates for leadership of the movement?

[Netanyahu] I won't add to what I've said.

[Shilon] But you've pointed a finger at an entire camp and at David Levy, who wants to lead the Likud.

[Netanyahu] Not at all. I haven't pointed a finger at anyone or any camp. I gave the media everything I wanted it to have and all the rest is nothing but rumor and idle talk. Maybe even the rumors are intentional, designed to destroy my credibility.

[Shilon] The police investigation can't take the place of the public test you have to pass. Why is it that you've been hiding behind the police investigation since last Thursday?

[Netanyahu] The fact is that I'm talking with you right now. The most serious of crimes was committed. The crime is so fantastic that it's difficult to keep the public from devouring it. Nothing like this has ever happened to a candidate for prime minister.

[Shilon] It was apparent during your television appearance that you're emotionally distraught. Have you been in full control of everything you've said?

[Netanyahu] I've been in full control of every word I've spoken. I consulted with the finest legal advisers in the country, spoke with my family and talked with others during the 24 hours between the time I received the threat and my television appearance. I knew, and I know with complete confidence, 100 percent, that the threat on me was not an empty one. When I made my decision to appear before the public and tell the truth, I acted with the necessary judgment, firmness and courage.

[Shilon] Actually, you could have foiled the blackmail attempt by going to the police right away instead of appearing on television. That also might have allowed the police to get to the bottom of it more effectively and reach clearer conclusions.

[Netanyahu] I hope the police investigation will remain a quiet one despite the publicity in the media and that none of its material will be leaked to the media.

[Shilon] You're appealing to the man on the street, aren't you?

[Netanyahu] That was one of the considerations in bringing our historic complaint to the police. I didn't want to waste a single moment in putting a stop to the blackmail. I didn't want the blackmailers to have the slightest doubt about their chances of blackmailing me. That's why I went on television. I've been pursuing two parallel courses right from the start, the public one and the police investigation.

[Shilon] Is there really a video tape?

[Netanyahu] I've never used that word. They said it on Army radio. I do know, however, that the blackmail threatens me with sensitive material, including photographs.

[Shilon] Are you certain that such photographs exist?

[Netanyahu] I can't add to what I've said.

[Shilon] Is it possible that the background to the blackmail attempt is criminal rather than political?

[Netanyahu] No.

[Shilon] What's your basis for saying that?

[Netanyahu] Solid information.

[Shilon] Perhaps this was actually a political hoax and you fell into the trap laid for you: you ran to the television studio, which reduced your chances in the political contest.

[Netanyahu] It's no coincidence that all sorts of rumors and accounts have been spread during this affair. I'm confident that the investigation will also be able to take into account the fact that someone is spreading rumors like these.

[Shilon] Aren't you meeting pistol shots with heavy artillery?

[Netanyahu] This didn't involve a pistol. Someone invades your family, throws a bomb like this at it and threatens to show sensitive material to the public; when you have reliable information that this is a serious conspiracy, methodically organized and accompanied by criminal actions every step of the way—that isn't pistol fire but an artillery barrage.

[Shilon] Who is the other woman?

[Netanyahu] I will not give her name.

[Shilon] The names of many women have been mentioned in the media lately; how can you taint them?

[Netanyahu] I'm not responsible for what has been written lately, but I definitely am responsible for the heartache my wife has suffered as a result of this incident. We're trying hard to overcome it.

[Shilon] Aren't you sorry now for the American style in which you conducted your campaign for leadership of the movement and the government?

[Netanyahu] No, I think the fact that 250,000 people have signed up for the Likud during a drive that many opposed is proof that the public sees a need to change the electoral system, not just for the Knesset but for the government and within the parties as well.

[Shilon] I wasn't thinking of that. What I mean is that in the United States, the political model you're copying, they're used to nosing around in the bedrooms of candidates for public office. Now it's come back at you like a boomerang.

[Netanyahu] Excuse me, that isn't what happened here. Everyone knows that public figures, like other people, sometimes have family problems or fall on their faces. And that goes for some of history's greatest leaders. Some of them had the most problem-ridden of private lives. It didn't prevent them from being great leaders.

Something else happened in my case. It isn't that my private matters have been exposed but that someone has used personal information for political blackmail. That has never happened even in the United States.

[Shilon] Isn't a candidate's conduct in his personal and family life relevant to the public's election decisions?

[Netanyahu] The public can make up its own mind. I'm not saying that the voter shouldn't take this into consideration but it has to be put into perspective. I think that the public in this country knows the difference between a politician's private life and his performance in office.

[Shilon] What's your response to those who say that cheating on one's lawfully wedded wife also indicates political treachery?

[Netanyahu] I don't think anyone could say such a thing in all seriousness. One Knesset member, Roni Milo, recently said, god forbid we should suspect an army man of betrayal of the state or the service just because he has problems with his wife. They're two completely different realms even if everyone has the right to make a connection between them.

[Shilon] And what about the traditional example that you present in your family behavior?

[Netanyahu] I've never offered my private life as a model to be emulated. I always look with a skeptical eye when someone boasts about his private life. Private life has to remain private.

[Shilon] What do you say to your potential voters who consider the integrity and the sanctity of the family an important component of the web of considerations that go into voting for you?

[Netanyahu] I say to them that they should look at the candidate's record in its totality.

[Shilon] But they want a direct answer to that question.

[Netanyahu] I still say that they should look at the entire record. I also ask them to look at the grave crime that has been committed here and my readiness to come out and fight against it. I'm not asking anyone to justify my personal failing. I myself certainly don't justify it. This is a matter between me and my family.

[Shilon] Can an adulterous prime minister be a good prime minister?

[Netanyahu] Don't ask me to give examples from the recent or distant past, from Israel or other countries. The public well knows the difference between a candidate's private life and his public service. The public knows that it isn't a matter of politicians being holy and pure. It's a matter of people who can slip up.

[Shilon] Is the prime minister, in his private life, permitted to behave like anyone?

[Netanyahu] I don't know what "like anyone" means. It's clear that someone who already holds a position has to think about all the consequences of one act or another.

In any event, I don't hide the fact that I slipped up. And I don't present it as anything less than that.

[Shilon] How, in your opinion, would the late Menachem Begin have reacted to you if he had heard of the affair?

[Netanyahu] I've never thought about it.

[Shilon] If a candidate for prime minister had homosexual tendencies, would you still say that that was his business?

[Netanyahu] That would become the public's business only if the candidate were subject to blackmail. That's exactly the point of my case, which I've succeeded in removing from the agenda. I'm not subject to blackmail. They can't blackmail me.

[Shilon] What do you have against David Levy?

[Netanyahu] That's not the issue. We're political adversaries for leadership of the Likud, nothing more than that.

[Shilon] But you two also have a long history of personal rivalry and mutual displeasure.

[Netanyahu] I've never said anything like that. But ask Mr. Levy. Maybe he acts that way.

[Shilon] What's your answer to people in his camp who accuse you of provocations?

[Netanyahu] Drivel.

[Shilon] They contend that you've lost control.

[Netanyahu] Drivel.

[Shilon] Do you intend to apologize to them?

[Netanyahu] For what? For the fact that I was a victim of blackmail and took vigorous action to stop it?

[Shilon] That wasn't the first attempt to get you. They also tried to put a black mark on your military record.

[Netanyahu] That was a shocking attempt after the fact, which boomeranged against those who tried it. I believe that the present attempt will also boomerang against the blackmailers. I invite all the slanderers to study my military record until they drop.

[Shilon] As this week comes to an end, is Bibi Netanyahu a wounded man?

[Netanyahu] This wasn't one of the easiest weeks of my life.

[Shilon] Was it a kick in the face?

[Netanyahu] It was hard, very hard. Hard first of all for my wife but hard for me, too.

[Shilon] Can you pick yourself up off the floor?

[Netanyahu] Yes, because I haven't fallen to the floor. In a situation like this, you draw on whatever strength of character you have and remember other crises you've faced in your life.

[Shilon] Have things settled down at home?

[Netanyahu] We're trying hard to overcome it.

[Shilon] Your enemies have already achieved their goal. They succeeded in weakening you.

[Netanyahu] I don't know whether they have weakened me but I'm heartened by the stream of letters I've been receiving from the public and the tremendous encouragement they've given me.

[Shilon] Are there signs that some are abandoning your camp for another?

[Netanyahu] I haven't seen any such signs but I don't entirely rule out the possibility. I feel that I have firm public support. The public isn't as stupid as people think.

[Shilon] After the blackmail attempt is Bibi Netanyahu different from the Netanyahu who started the campaign?

[Netanyahu] I have to be different. No one can go through such experiences unmarked by them in some way.

[Shilon] Have you become less of a person?

[Netanyahu] I've learned more about suffering. I'm more experienced. Despite the information I had, it was difficult for me to believe that such human evil could exist or that someone could sink so low. We all want to believe that there is a limit to depravity. In that sense, I've discovered a gaping abyss of villainy that I'd hoped never to see in this country.

[Shilon] Has something happened to your self-confidence?

[Netanyahu] No, I'm carrying on out of a deep inner sense of conviction.

[Shilon] Even so, you've spoken in this interview in a tone that's more subdued than is usual for you.

[Netanyahu] Maybe it seems that way to you sitting across from me, but if you were to come with me now to an election rally, you would see me as you've seen me in the past.

[Shilon] How far away from you have the leadership of the Likud and the government moved this week?

[Netanyahu] Overall, I don't think a serious change has taken place. My feeling is that the public will come out against the blackmailer rather than the victim.

[Shilon] Bibi Netanyahu, will you someday be prime minister?

[Netanyahu] I believe that I will.

[Shilon] That's the proof that your self-confidence hasn't been shaken.

[Netanyahu] No, it definitely hasn't been shaken.

[Shilon] Thank you.

Possible HABAD Split After 'Messianic' Events

93AF0381A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Feb 93 p B2

[Article by Shlomo Shamir]

[Text]

It May Boomerang

Calmer and more clearheaded, away from the glare of media spotlights, the community leaders of the Lubavitcher Rebbe's court in Brooklyn are busy with the interim balance of the "We Want Moshiah [Messiah] Now" campaign. Those who rejected the campaign from the beginning prefer to call it "the damage-and-loss balance." One, a veteran member of the court's secretariat, said yesterday that "the damage is even worse than those who were against declaring the rabbi as Messiah feared it would be." Speaking off the record, veteran HABAD activists said that the campaign to crown the rebbe and the media uproar it has caused, have left the court wounded and humiliated, and—even worse—now in danger of a schism that it will take a great effort to prevent.

For the elderly Hasidim, to whom the rebbe is, above all, their guide in Hasidism and the heir to the teachings of his predecessors, their Hasidism, which, as its name reflects, has always been known for its emphasis on the intellectual and the principles of reason ("Habad" comes from the initials of "Hohma," "Bina," and "Da'at"—"Wisdom," "Understanding," and "Knowledge"), has begun to take on the character of a mystic Messianic movement.

Longing for the Messiah's coming has from its inception been a cornerstone of the Hasidic movement, and its rebbes have never hidden their desire to speed up the redemption. This found expression in their books and Torah lessons. But their approach to the subject was usually very restrained, and kept the rule that you do not take it out into the streets of the city. The Gerer Rebbe, "Admor" ["Our Master, Teacher, and Rabbi"] Yisra'el 'Alter, known as "Bet Yisra'el" after his book of the same name, used to say that "those who talk about the end of days know nothing about it, and those who do know are not talking."

Hasidim have the right to believe that their revered rebbe will bring them redemption and lead them in greeting the Messiah. But the sin of those Lubavitchers who declared their rebbe the "King Messiah" was that they dragged this complicated and emotional topic into the street, and bared it before the masses and the media. A well-known Hasidic rebbe in Brooklyn complained this week, "Have you ever seen a diamond merchant who shouted his wares in a booth in the souk [open-air market]?"

Habad Hasidim, whose slogan is "Bring the Wellsprings Outward," have always made expert use of the media and even aroused bitterness this way from the courts of other Admorim, who prefer that their spiritual activities be mainly directed inwardly. Now a few of the activist

leaders in the Habad movement admit that the courtship of newspapers and television, and the exaggerated attention the movement has given the media, and vice versa, have boomeranged.

"No one has ever dared to attack the image of the rebbe or his standing as a great spiritual leader the way these Hasidim have, they who initiated and carried out the campaign to crown him King Messiah as though they were possessed," a Lubavitcher from Crown Heights complained this week. "I do not understand how we allowed a group of young people to lead the whole movement, even important rabbis, by the nose," he said.

According to stories circulating in the court in Brooklyn, several of the rabbis who signed the proclamation crowning the rebbe as Messiah added their signatures only after threats and warnings. One campaign leader threatened a rabbi of the Lubavitcher movement in Israel, warning that if he did not sign the proclamation, he (the threatener) would stop laying tefillin [placing phylacteries on his arm during daily prayers].

The Hasidim close to the rebbe opposed the campaign, and are now worried mainly over the danger of a schism. It is true that the Messianists did retreat at the last moment from their intention to announce the date the rebbe would reveal himself as the Messiah, and did agree, after much coaxing, to be satisfied with declaring him the Messiah—but Habad Hasidism was exposed as lacking cohesion and discipline, two things that are the foundation of any Hasidic court.

Trying to avoid a schism in the Habad movement, the Hasidim close to the rebbe, along with the secretariat, have already begun a campaign to persuade the Messianists to give up their activities and cease all proclamations or advertisements. Steps are also being considered against those who resist efforts at persuasion and continue to foster the image of the rebbe as Messiah.

The rebbe is under the constant care of a team of physicians, and cannot intervene in what is going on in his court, or answer the wave of letters and requests that come to the secretariat daily. Two of those closest to him, Leyb Gruner and Yehuda Karinski, visit him several times a day and present him with the questions of

the Hasidim, mainly about matchmaking or medical problems. They say that the rebbe answers the questions with a nod of the head. But for some people, that is enough.

A nucleus of zealous Hasidim, known in the court as the "blacks," meet from time to time, mainly after services on the Sabbath, for intimate discussion. One participant told me that the Hasidim bewail their bitter fate, their abandonment without an active leader, and losing their "Oneg Shabbes" [the Joy of the Sabbath: the talk the rebbe used to give every Sabbath after services]. "Now we are like all the other Hasidim in Brooklyn, who rush home after Shabbes services to eat cholent," they lament. They are angry at the way a few members of the secretariat have courted the media, and believe that the newspaper advertisements have cheapened the image of the rebbe, whom they revere as a Tzadik [Hasidic religious leader] and holy man. After THE NEW YORK TIMES "Supplement" published a profile of the Lubavitcher Rebbe in honor of his 90th birthday, the zealots expressed outrage against one man close to the rebbe because this man had cooperated with the journalist.

The Messianists are condemned because their activities have made the question of inheritance, which for loyal Hasidim is basically a taboo, a subject of public discussion. Even in private conversations, Hasidim avoid saying much about the question of who will take the rebbe's place once he "reaches 120." In moments of candor, the names of important Hasidim, or of a few of those close to the rebbe, may come up, but clearly none of them has the rebbe's charisma or his leadership ability.

"Despite all that the Lubavitcher Hasidim say or tell about the rebbe, he is truly a great man, one of the spiritual giants of Hasidism in our times," an expert on Habad Hasidim wrote with some sarcasm not long ago. But it is precisely many of his own Hasidim who lack the tools to appreciate his greatness in Torah. So they are dragged into activities that add nothing to the rebbe's honor. Those close to the rebbe in Brooklyn hope that the gloomy situation the court and the Habad movement are in now can still be reversed.

Uses, Limitations of Initial Loan Package

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p B1

[Article by Judy Meletz; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text]

What Do You Do With 2 Billion Dollars?

It seems that policymakers are already doubting the market's power to carry out optimal allocation of the loan guarantee funds from the United States.

The campaign to recruit the 2 billion dollars to be covered by the U.S. guarantees went into high gear this week, when senior officials from the finance ministry left for New York to choose undersigners for the bond issue. In March, the finance ministry intends to issue bonds in the American financial market in the range of a billion dollars—covered by the guarantees—and to issue another billion dollars' worth at a later stage this year.

Questions such as how to recruit the money, what kinds of bonds to issue, in what amounts, and under what conditions, are bothering the leaders of the financial establishment in Jerusalem less these days. For such topics, the finance ministry's general accounting branch has plenty of experts who have already proven their ability to get the Israeli Government the very best conditions on the world financial market. And in addition, last week the finance ministry chose the "Morgan Stanley Investment Bank" as special financial adviser for the bond issue.

What could become a bit more controversial is how the recruited funds are to be used once they are in the state coffers. Until recently, economic decisionmakers supported the approach that the free market mechanism should be allowed to determine where the money would go, and that the government should not interfere in its allocation. But over the last few weeks, they have begun to sing a somewhat different tune.

When discussions began a year and a half ago on the Israeli loan request, the heads of the finance ministry and the Bank of Israel had a very simple plan: We will take the money and put it into the Bank of Israel's foreign currency reserves. Because of the expected high growth, investment in the economy will increase, which will then mean more requests for foreign currency to finance imports of equipment and machinery. The business sector will come to the Bank of Israel—as it does every day—and buy foreign currency to finance these purchases. Whoever imports more will buy more foreign currency, and vice versa, and thus the funds from the guarantees will be allocated without any preference going to one sector or another, and without any government interference, but simply following the laws of supply and demand.

The government's role in all of this would be limited to creating microeconomic conditions that would encourage growth: for instance, an exchange-rate policy

that would assure export profitability, reasonable interest rates, and low inflation.

The Americans, of course, loved this approach, for their great fear was that the Israeli Government would take the money, as it has done more than once in the past, and use it to raise the country's standard of living, inflate public services, and increase private and public consumption. So, it was very important to the administration that the Israeli economic leaders understand that this was a case of a state guaranteeing to cover loans, not some kind of grant, and that since the Israeli Government would have to return the money at some stage in the future, with interest and fees, it would have to invest it in projects that would bring in a profit.

Until recently, of course, all the economic policymakers in Jerusalem relied on the thesis that we could depend on the free market to make the optimal allocation of the money from the guarantees. If there were doubters, they dared not raise their voices.

But during the past few weeks, several things have happened from which we can conclude that a certain change in approach has taken place. This change expresses itself in the growing sense that the market mechanism in the Israeli economy is not sophisticated enough to carry out the allocation by itself. And beyond this, the business sector does not have enough initiative to increase its investments at one shot to the tune of 2 billion dollars. So a little direction from above is needed.

The first mention of the subject came from a somewhat unexpected direction—the director of the Bank of Israel, Professor Ya'akov Frankel, one of the most avid supporters of the free market school.

In the plan that he presented several weeks ago for allocation of the guarantee money, Frankel hinted of the possibility of "earmarking" part of the money—not, God forbid, to add to the government's current consumption, but to increase investment in infrastructure and education, and establish special lines of credit for the commercial sector.

Outlined below are the main points of the director's proposal, first presented before the "Economics and Business Club" in Tel Aviv:

- This year, 600 million dollars of the guarantee money would be invested in infrastructure and education. This means about half of the amount set aside for these topics in the 1993 budget proposal. This would allow the government to recruit less money in the local financial market for funding the deficit, and thus ensure low interest rates in the long run.
- Another 600 million dollars would be put at the disposal of financial agents, mainly banks, to provide credit to the business sector. According to the proposal that is crystallizing, this money would be made available through special monthly tenders.
- Another 800 million would be designated for increasing foreign currency reserves, to enable larger sales of dollars to the business sector for funding

purchases of investment assets from imports.

After Frankel presented his proposal, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin also mentioned that Israel will be receiving a considerable sum of money in the next few months, but it still has not been decided how the money is to be used. At the government session two weeks ago, Rabin asked Finance Minister Avraham Shohat to present him "at the earliest possible moment" with a detailed plan for utilization of the guarantees.

From the very fact that the prime minister is asking for a detailed plan, we can conclude that he also does not entirely trust the free-market mechanism, and would prefer that the government be more actively involved in allocating the funds.

A few days ago, finance ministry managing director 'Aharon Vogel met with the prime minister's financial adviser, 'Ilan Fla'to, for the purpose of crystallizing a joint position paper on the topic of utilization of the guarantees. The discussions are expected to continue when Vogel returns from New York at the end of the week.

In the decisionmaking ranks of the economy, a consensus is beginning to be seen—that the guarantee money should not all be put into the Bank of Israel to raise the reserves, as previously suggested, but that at least part of it should be "earmarked" for goals seen as

having the highest national priority, such as increasing investment in infrastructure and education.

A basic question that the decisionmakers will have to consider is whether to use this "earmarked" money for funding projects already included in the state budget for 1993, and in this way enable the government to reduce the scope of its recruitment in the capital market for funding the deficit, or whether it would be preferable to rewrite the budget and enlarge the investments in these projects, in order to spur economic activity.

It is worthwhile to point out that the State of Israel does not have a completely free hand in deciding how to allocate the money from the guarantees. As part of the "implementation agreement" on the subject of the guarantees, signed a month ago with members of the U.S. administration, Israel is forbidden to use the guarantee money to expand current expenditures in the regular budget. Therefore, if she intends to designate part of the funds for budgetary expenditures, she will have to detail precisely how much will go to which branches, and the Americans will surely want to receive regular reports on the subject.

Another limitation included within the "implementation agreement" framework is that the money must not be used for investment in the territories. On this subject at least, the U.S. administration seems less worried today than it was a year ago, when the Likud government was in charge.

Missile Deterrence Doctrine, IAF Alternatives

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[Article by Aluf Ben]

[Text] Israel's reaction to the Iraqi missile attacks during the Gulf war concluded with warnings whose affects faded under the rain of Scuds. Israel failed to deter Iraq from launching ground-to-ground missiles at population centers. After Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and Haifa were hit, it did nothing.

At the end of the war, the defense establishment was condemned for bungling the buildup of military power. Central to the criticism was the claim that it was doubtful whether Israel had the proper means to strike back at Iraq even if it had wanted to do so. Top commanders feared the political price that Israel would have had to pay for an escalation of hostilities that could have resulted from massive retaliation by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces].

Israel's theory of deterrence is based on the threat of devastating retaliation for any attack on the Israeli rear. Yitzhaq Rabin said during the Gulf war, "We told the Syrians that Damascus would be destroyed if they used ground-to-ground missiles on Tel Aviv. If they fired missiles at Haifa, neither Damascus nor Halab would continue to exist; both would be destroyed." The prime minister and the minister of defense still believe that in an Arab-Israeli war, without the complication of the Gulf war and the American coalition, Israel would need to make clear to the Arabs that any attack on its population centers would be answered with a reply 100 times as powerful on Arab cities.

From information published in Israel and abroad after the Gulf war, and from analysis of comments made by Israel's leaders during the war, it is clear that the IDF presented the political authorities two options for retaliating against Scud attacks:

- Dispatching the Air Force to strike missile launch sites or retaliate against sensitive targets in Iraq. Yitzhaq Shamir, who was prime minister, rejected proposals made by Avihu Bin-Nun, then commander of the Air Force, to send dozens of planes on such a mission. The Americans, who opposed Israeli action, warned against entangling Jordan and Saudi Arabia, through whose skies the Air Force would have had to fly en route to Iraq. Bin-Nun warned during the war that the Jordanian Air Force would "cease to exist" if it interfered with his planes.
- Massive retaliation of another type. Such a drastic reaction would have been considered if Iraq had launched chemical warheads at Israel. The American secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, issued a warning during the war that the Israelis would reply with unconventional weapons if they were attacked with chemicals. When asked about this, Moshe Arens, then Israel's minister of defense, replied, "Saddam Husayn has something to worry about."

Between the conventional option of dropping bombs from planes and the massive response of another sort, there simply were no other means. "For years, we invested billions of dollars in weapons systems but never developed an answer to Scud missiles," confessed a reserve general who for many years was one of the senior officers responsible for setting Israel's defense policy.

Critics have spoken of long-term neglect and contended that the army must provide the political authorities a range of possibilities for retaliation. It is inconceivable, they say, that an Arab state should escape paying a heavy price for an attack on Israel. In their opinion, the Gulf war revealed the limitations of relying on the Air Force as the long arm of the IDF. The use of planes entailed a risk that the pilots would be killed or captured and of possible confrontation with states on the way to Iraq. The Air Force depends on precise, up-to-date intelligence about its targets and a complex system of command and control at a distance of hundreds of kilometers. Airplanes also have difficulty operating at night or in harsh weather. A Scud has no such limitations.

According to this approach, the right answer to Scuds is a weapon just like it: an inexpensive, conventional ground-to-ground missile that can be produced in large numbers—"1,000 little missiles." Defense experts believe that launching such a "terrorist missile" at the capital of Iraq in retaliation for a Scud attack on Tel Aviv would not have resulted in escalation. The political risk involved in using a little missile is far smaller than that of a flight of dozens of attack aircraft over the skies of Baghdad. If the missile is accurate, unlike the Scud and its Iraqi-made progeny, it can threaten sensitive point targets in enemy territory. Israelis remember the bombardment of the Syrian general staff in Damascus during the Yom Kippur War.

The chief critic of the doctrine of reliance on the Air Force and of its shortcomings during the Gulf War is the deputy minister of defense, Gen. (Res.) Yisrael Tal.

The criticism leveled by Tal and his colleagues has not been wholly accepted in the defense establishment; it arouses resistance from those who believe in the capability of the Air Force and argue that no need exists for any other reply to missile attacks from remote countries. They regard any investment in developing such responses as a waste of money. "If the object is to punish or deter, the Air Force is capable of that mission, as was proved by the strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor," says one, a prominent member of this circle. "We had no reason to think that the Air Force was unable to serve as our long arm."

Air Force proponents say that the air plane is a multi-purpose instrument. It can reach Baghdad, but it will be used in most instances for more important assignments to tip the scales on the battlefield. The "terrorist missile," if the IDF had it, is good for a single target, and there is no assurance that Israel will be subject in the next conflict to the threats it faced in the Gulf War.

In the years before the Gulf war, Israel did not prepare itself to absorb missile attacks from over the horizon. The chief object of war according to defense theory was to defeat the enemy. The strategy was to take the war to the enemy's territory and present such a threat to his vital installations that he would sue for a cease-fire.

This doctrine was suitable for wars against neighboring states. Israel, however, is unable to defeat Iraq, Libya or Iran, which are much farther away. Military history teaches also that it is difficult to deter a distant enemy by conventional means. Rabin can threaten to destroy Syria's cities because they are vulnerable to attack from a distance of a few minutes flying time from central Israel. But the Air Force would face difficulties in exacting a similar price from the Iraqis and maintaining an aggressive presence over its cities for more than a short time. It also is still an open question whether an attack on the enemy's rear acts as a deterrent. Baghdad absorbed many more bombs and missiles during the Gulf war than Tel Aviv, yet the number of Scuds launched did not decrease.

The defense system debated during the 1980s whether to update its defense doctrine, which David Ben-Gurion had fixed during the first years of the state. And if the IDF's multiyear plan of 1986 still did not deal with threats originating from countries farther away than Israel's neighbors, the multiyear plan adopted in 1988 did take into account the threat of missiles launched from periphery states such as Iraq and Libya.

Opponents of the changes in the defense doctrine contend that Israel has no choice but to get used to the existence of a "homefront" and to learn to live with Scuds, at least until the development of effective devices for intercepting them. In their opinion, the Scud is unable to determine the outcome of war; thus, Israel must not be drawn into a contest over terror in its population centers, which would divert its attention from the need to win the war at the front.

Supporters of the policy of "missile against missile" argue that there is no moral drawback in using ground-to-ground missiles for retaliation. In recent years, however, an international norm, based on moral considerations, has evolved against the use of long-range missiles, which it lumps together with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Israeli Government's arms control initiative, proposed by Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres, primarily seeks the removal of missile weapons in

the Middle East. Israel is also a signatory to the international arms inspection treaty, which is designed to prevent the proliferation of missile technology.

Ground-to-ground missiles entered the Middle Eastern arena during the Yom Kippur war. The Syrians fired Frog missiles at the Air Force base at Ramat David, striking towns such as Givat and Migdal Ha'emek in the Jezreel Valley. In retaliation, the Air Force struck targets deep in Syria and Damascus. The Egyptians launched Scud missiles during the Yom Kippur War, aiming for IDF forces in the Sinai and west of the Suez Canal.

In 1975, the United States sent Israel a battery of Lance missiles, which had an operational range of 75 km and carried a conventional warhead. The Lance was incorporated into the artillery corps but was never used and eventually became obsolete. The next stage was delivery of Pershing missiles, with a range up to 750 km, which were promised Israel after the Sinai interim agreements of 1975. The Carter administration, however, froze the deal and it was never fulfilled.

Israel has never admitted possessing long-range missiles. According to foreign reports, Israel has been involved since the early 1960s in developing ground-to-ground missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which the reports dubbed the "Jericho." Development began in cooperation with the French company Desau and continued in Israel after the Six Day War. American documents seized in Iran revealed that former Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann stated that the missile went into service in 1970.

According to foreign accounts, Iran signed an agreement in 1977 for joint production of a missile with a range of 500 km and a conventional warhead weighing 750 kg. The deal fell apart after the fall of the shah's regime in 1979. In the 1980s, the foreign media reported that Israel was jointly developing nuclear-armed missiles with South Africa and had jointly tested a missile with a range of 1,400 km in 1989. Late in 1991, Israel pledged to stop exporting missile technology. Richard Clark, then U.S. assistant secretary of state, asserted that he had compelled Israel to sever its ties to South Africa and cancel their joint projects.

Foreign reports further state that two models were developed, one with a range of 500 km and the other with a range of 800 to 1,500 km (the reports vary). During the Gulf war, the Israeli press published a map of the Middle East showing estimated ranges of Iraqi and Israeli missiles. The Israeli missile mentioned in foreign reports looked more menacing on the map but remained in its silo while Iraqi missiles sowed destruction in Israel's cities.

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